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Globalization of the defense industrial complex, including the production and sale of 
weapons, has increased the extent to which highly sophisticated weaponry is shared. As 
the number one arms producer and seller in the world, the United States (U.S.) must be 
cognizant of its potential consequences. This thesis analyzes the impacts of the 
globalization of the defense industrial complex on U.S. national security via increased 
international production, U.S. sale of weapons to allies, and U.S. sale of weapons to 
regional alliances. Chapter one explores the globalization of defense production, post-
Cold War, through the joint production effort of the Joint Strike Fighter, and the rise of 
China as a competitor defense manufacturing hub with differing foreign policy interests. 
Chapter two focuses on how U.S. arms transfers to allies affect alliances by exploring 
U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Egypt arms transfer alliances. Chapter three assesses the impact of 
U.S. arms transfers on regional alliances and U.S. national security by analyzing the 
effects of such on the Arab League, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). This thesis demonstrates that these aspects of the globalization 
of the defense industrial complex affect U.S. national military and economic security and 
the ability of the U.S. to attain its foreign policy objectives. U.S. production and sale of 
weapons to foreign parties’ bolsters U.S. economic and military might through 
contributions to U.S. GDP and cost sharing of U.S. defense acquisitions, while 
simultaneously providing an avenue to strengthen alliances and increase influence. At the 
same time, the U.S. must continue to guard against the negative side effects of this 
globalization; the proliferation of complex and highly capable weaponry, competitor 
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While the arms trade is by no means a new phenomenon, the globalization of 
arms production and the sophistication of weaponry being transferred in conjunction with 
the relaxation of arms exports restrictions in the United States (U.S.), warrant a fresh look 
at the global defense industrial complex. Globalization has intensified the weapons 
capabilities available around the world through trade and the offshoring of production, 
enabling countries to produce their own weaponry and become competitor manufacturing 
hubs. One would expect that the spread of highly capable weaponry would increase 
global instability and foreign competitor manufacturing hubs while decreasing U.S. 
military technological superiority, thus acting to the detriment of U.S. national security. 
This thesis will begin with a macro level exploration of the impact of the globalization of 
the defense industrial complex on U.S. national security. This will provide the foundation 
needed to specifically address U.S. arms transfers to foreign markets and their possible 
consequences for U.S. national security.  
The global arms trade is a multi-billion dollar industry.1 Within this industry, the 
U.S. has been the overall top producer and exporter of arms since 1950.2 Given the nature 
                                                          
1 Though it is difficult to decipher the precise dollar value of the arms trade from year to year due to lack of 
transparency and international norms for tracking arms, the value of the arms trade in 2012 was at least 58 
billion USD. Siemon T. Wezeman, “SIPRI Yearbook 2014: International arms transfers,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2014/05 (accessed March 4, 
2015). 
2 In 2012 alone, the US had an estimated 15.8 billion USD in arms transfers, not to mention 62.9 billion 
USD in arms agreements (which include technical data, training, and defense services along with hardware 
over a ten year period). This represents a significant increase from 2003 when the US had 9.7 billion USD 
in arms exports and 12.6 billion USD in arms agreements. Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), “The financial value of the global arms trade.” 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/measuring/financial_values/financial_values_deafult 
(accessed March 4, 2015) 
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and purpose of arms, it is prudent for U.S. policy makers to maintain a clear 
understanding of how U.S. arms exports affect U.S. national security. Arms are not only 
the weapons of war, many having lethal capabilities, but can also be used as political 
tools, simply as threats or statements of power. The use of arms as political tools can be 
practiced by both the exporter and the importer of arms. Importers can simply obtain 
weapons to be used as threats or symbols of the exporters backing. Exporters can at the 
same time use their arms exports to signal support of one side in a conflict or use the 
export as a negotiation point with the recipient. Regardless of its purpose, all arms 
exports impact the exporting state’s national security. The comprehensive analytical 
breakdown of the issue presented demonstrates that U.S. arms production and sales have 
a net positive impact on U.S. national security. U.S. military and economic security as 
well as the ability of the U.S. to carry out its foreign policy objectives is enhanced 
through its defense industrial base. At the same time there are potential negative 
outcomes that must be guarded against.  
The value and sophistication of weapons traded has increased with globalization. 
Concurrently the introduction of international collaborative complex weapons production 
has appeared as an emerging phenomenon. A progressively pervasive involvement of 
players on the world stage has been magnified by the impact of globalization on the arms 
trade. Individuals, organizations, companies and corporations, and governments are 
increasingly interconnected as communications and other technologies increase the 
ability for these parties to communicate and exchange not only ideas in real-time but 
exchange goods faster than ever before. Communications, travel, trade, and collaboration, 
while also not novel activities, now occur at a comparatively amplified speed due to the 
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seemingly ever-advancing technological improvements occurring in the frontiers of these 
fields, resulting in an increased frequency and intensity. As such, globalization has 
affected all aspects of modern life and global governance.  The production and sale of 
defense products or weapons has not been excluded from the phenomena of 
globalization. The amplification of frequency and intensification in complexity of 
weapons transferred within the arms trade is exemplified by its billion dollar value.  
Elke Krahmann and Terrence Guay have addressed the globalization of the 
defense industrial complex. Notably, Krahmann does so by framing the discussion in a 
post-Cold War context. Both authors speak of the need for companies to secure 
international contracts and the need for international mergers in light of national defense 
budget cuts, without which companies would face bankruptcy.34 Krahmann highlights the 
idea of a need for the global governance of the security sector while Guay argues that 
governments must enhance national security. They find agreement in the possible 
negative consequences resulting from the globalization of the defense industrial complex. 
However, both authors make their arguments while neglecting an in-depth analysis of the 
implications of this globalization.  Richard A. Bitzinger also analyzes the effects of the 
globalization of the defense industrial complex, focusing on U.S. production, sales, and 
security, but again his analysis is based on data from the era immediately following the 
Cold War and as such is outdated.5 In response to the outdated assessments of this very 
relevant issue, this paper will provide an up to date investigation of the globalization of 
                                                          
3 Terrence Guay, "Globalization and the Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base," UNISCI Discussion Papers 
19 (2009). 
4 Elke Krahmann, "Conceptualizing security governance," Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 1 (2003). 
5 Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge," 
International Security (1994). 
4 
 
the defense industrial base. The central focus will be to provide a contemporary look at 
how U.S. national security is impacted so that any potential negative outcomes can be 
guarded against and positive impacts can be bolstered.  
The globalization of the defense industrial complex, as detailed in the following 
chapters, includes the internationalization of the production of complex weapons and 
their components as well as an increase in international arms sales of highly capable 
weapon systems. More specifically, for the purpose of analyzing the globalization of the 
defense industrial complex, globalization will be defined as ‘the growing 
interdependence of defense companies through increasing trade in military technology 
and defense services and the international transactions and capital flows that surround 
those, resulting in the diffusion of military technology around the world.’6 
 The internationalization of production and the increased transfer of sophisticated 
weaponry are used to investigate the impact of the globalization of the defense industrial 
base on U.S. national security. The impact on U.S. national security is directly linked to 
the ability the U.S. has to regulate arms and manufacturing know-how transferred from 
its shores.7 In order to ascertain the impact of the spread of defense production it is 
important to learn the historical patterns and trends that have shaped the industry today. 
The globalization that occurred post-Cold War and its impact on the defense industry is 
an ideal starting point as this era has many similarities to today; the end of long and 
                                                          
6 This definition is based on the IMF’s definition of globalization as applied to the arms trade. International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May 1997, p. 45. 
7 ‘Manufacturing know-how’ is the terminology used within the arms trade sector in the US to denote the 
knowledge of how to manufacture specific arms. U.S. Department of State: Directorate of Defense Trade 
Controls. “Guidelines for Preparing Agreements.” http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/documents 
(accessed March 17, 2015) 
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expensive wars involving the U.S., the reduced profits of defense companies, and the 
beginnings of the globalization of the defense industrial complex. With this foundation, 
the impact of current joint development projects and potential future threats will be 
reviewed, such as the rise of competitor manufacturing hubs like that which exists in 
China. The U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Egypt alliances are used as case studies in the 
investigation of how arms transfers affect alliances as they are large recipients of arms 
transfers in a strategically important yet unstable region. If U.S. arms transfers to its allies 
negatively impact those same alliances, U.S. national security would be negatively 
impacted in turn, as alliances are critical to strengthening national security.  
To further the investigation of how arms transfers impact U.S. national security, it 
is necessary to determine the impact of transfers on regional alliances especially in 
unstable regions such as the Middle East, as such, transfers to the Arab League are used 
as the main case study in this investigation. In order to account for the possible impact of 
uniquely regional factors, the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) are used as secondary case studies. If U.S. arms transfers to regional 
alliances are destabilizing, again, U.S. national security would suffer as the U.S. might be 
drawn into foreign conflicts.   
The first chapter explores the globalization of the defense industrial complex in 
order to establish its impact on U.S. national military and economic security. Though, the 
arms trade was present and certainly a dynamic industry before and during the Cold War, 
defense manufacturing or production typically resided within the borders of a country. 
Prior to the Cold War, defense companies typically manufactured the most complex 
weapons systems for the use of the state in which the company was housed. Post-Cold 
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War, international mergers of defense companies surged as national defense budgets 
shrank and companies sought to continue their existence and profitability. As the number 
one producer and distributor of arms in the world, it is vital that U.S. policy makers are 
aware of the real and possible outcomes of this form of globalization. Current U.S. 
policies allow for the furtherance of this globalization. However, if severe negative 
impacts result, it would be a clear indicator that regulations should be changed to lessen 
those negative outcomes.  
This phenomenon and its consequences will be investigated and analyzed via case 
studies of international private defense company collaboration post-Cold War, through 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) production, and defense production in China as a competitor 
manufacturing hub. These case studies demonstrate the increasing internationalization of 
private defense production. The increased global collaboration in arms production and 
trade that took place at the end of the Cold War demonstrates the increased global 
cooperation between defense companies that occurs after the end of costly war efforts. 
This is significant, as the U.S. has just recently ended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and the U.S. defense budget has been set to be reduced in-turn.8 Though it is not 
uncommon for defense spending to be reduced in post conflict environments, the 
economic impact on private defense companies pushes companies to increase foreign 
sales, international mergers, and collaborative projects. The health of the U.S. industrial 
                                                          
8 The latest official defense budget data available from the White House had the US defense budget at $553 
billion for fiscal year 2012. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_defense. At the same 
time the Budget Control Act of 2011 set up major defense budget cuts to be enacted starting in 2013 and 
continuing over the proceeding decade. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s365enr/pdf/BILLS-
112s365enr.pdf. Although the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 reduced required spending cuts, future budget 




base is not only important for economic security due to its contribution to U.S. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), but also for its continued supply of weaponry to the U.S. 
military.  
JSF is an example of a current effort to jointly design and produce a highly 
sophisticated weapon system with multiple partner nations. The idea behind joint 
international research and development projects is that partner nations not only attain 
interoperability but will experience savings due to cost-sharing. The development of 
complex weapons systems are generally very costly to not only develop but to produce. 
At the same time, joint development projects such as the JSF ease the spread of 
manufacturing know-how and the proliferation of complex weaponry, allowing for the 
greater possibility of the establishment of competitor manufacturing hubs. The 
proliferation of complex weapon system manufacturing know-how not only has the 
potential for reducing the technological superiority of U.S. forces through proliferation, 
but allows for foreign parties to gain the ability to manufacture similarly complex 
weaponry. The chapter concludes that while the expansion of international defense 
collaboration and production increases the potential threat of growing foreign competitor 
manufacturing hubs and the spread of complex weaponry to non-traditional allies, it has 
the net positive impact of supporting the continued health of U.S. defense companies. In 
turn, U.S. economic security as well as U.S. military security is strengthened through 
reduced procurement costs and a continued domestic supply of weaponry.  
In addition to the globalization of the defense industrial complex, the international 
transfer of highly sophisticated weaponry is also of concern to the U.S. The U.S. must 
guard its military’s technological edge which is an important component of U.S. military 
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security, and ensure that its arms transfers strengthen its alliances rather than acting to 
their detriment, which also factors into U.S. national security. Chapter two explores U.S. 
exports of arms to its allies and the effects those arms transfers have on the alliance. 
Within this investigation, Stephen Walt’s definition of alliances is used, defining an 
alliance as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or 
more sovereign states.”9 This definition is fitting as the U.S. does not maintain formal 
alliances cemented through written treaties with many of the countries it exports arms to. 
Furthermore, there are varying definitions of arms and differing modes through which 
they can be transferred. Part of the reason behind the lack of availability of arms transfer 
data is the lack of consensus regarding how to classify what arms are. The analysis in 
chapter two specifically focuses on arms that are transferred from one government to 
another, or government-to-government, as the focus of the chapter is on the alliance 
between two states. In the U.S., government-to-government arms transfers are labeled 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS).  
All three chapters in this thesis focus on conventional weapons or arms as 
opposed to unconventional weapons, which include chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons. For the purpose of this thesis, conventional arms or weapons are defined as 
“weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities 
designed for military use.”10 Chapters two and three focus more specifically on major 
conventional weapons, which exclude small arms, light weapons, man-portable air 
defense systems, anti-tank missiles, trucks, ammunitions, and parts and components.11 
                                                          
9 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 12.  
10 Christian Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence (New York: Taylor& Francis, 1990), 7. 
11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database – Methodology,” 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background (accessed March 8, 2015). 
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The second and third chapters therefore focus on the transfer of aircraft, missiles, sensors, 
satellites, ships, engines, artillery, armored vehicles, anti-submarine warfare weapons, 
and air defense systems.  
In chapter two, the arms transfer relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia 
is used as the main case study in this investigation. Saudi Arabia is one of the top arms 
importers in the world and has been an important strategic partner for the U.S. in the 
Middle East. Many describe the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as an 
arms for oil relationship, which speaks to the importance of U.S. sale of arms to the 
country. The U.S. arms transfer relationship with Egypt is another alliance that is used to 
extrapolate the impact of arms transfers on alliances. Egypt presents an interesting case 
study as it was one of the largest recipients of U.S. military aid since the Camp David 
Accords in 1978; a relationship that became questionable after the Arab Spring and the 
consequent turmoil and changes in governance in the country. The Middle East is a 
region that has experienced enduring instability and change and thus is an important 
region in which the U.S. must ensure that weapons transfers do not have negative effects.  
The case studies of U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Egyptian arms transfer alliances 
demonstrate that arms transfers within alliances strengthen the alliance by increasing 
trust, interoperability, stability, security, and deterrence. At the same time, weapons 
proliferation and dependence are factors that may be negatively impacted and thus must 
be factored into transactions. In a region, not unlike the Middle East, that has historically 
experienced instability, regime change, terrorist activity, and the like, the ability of the 
foreign government to secure the weapons it purchases against misuse must also be 
factored into the calculus of whether the arms sale has more potential benefit or 
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detriment. At the same time, U.S. economic security is strengthened through the sale of 
weapons and the follow-on support of the weapons systems sold. U.S. military security is 
also strengthened through increased stability and interoperability as well as the passing of 
some aspects of ensuring stability and security on to the purchaser, rather than the foreign 
government relying on the U.S. to ensure its security with U.S. military personnel. The 
ability of the U.S. to achieve foreign policy objectives is also strengthened through 
increased trust and cooperation. Thus, again there appears to be a net benefit for U.S. 
military and economic security resulting from the export of arms.  
Chapter three of this thesis delves even further into the resulting consequences of 
the globalization of defense production and trade beyond private industry and one-on-one 
international governmental relations. This chapter analyzes how arms transfers to 
regional alliances affect U.S. national security. Stephen Walt’s definition of alliance is 
applied to regional alliances. In this analysis, a region is defined as “a cluster of states 
that are proximate to each other and are interconnected in spatial, cultural and ideational 
terms in a significant and distinguishable manner.”12 The alliances that are investigated 
are thus regional security alliances that the U.S. exports to. This chapter expands the 
modes of arms transfer included in its analysis to include not only FMS but also Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS) which include arms transferred directly from private defense 
companies in the U.S. to foreign parties, and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) which 
include weapons that the U.S. military has in excess and can therefore transfer at a 
discount to foreign governments.  
                                                          
12 T.V. Paul, ed, International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 4. 
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The impact of these arms transfers, from the U.S. to regional alliances, and their 
resulting impact on the U.S. is investigated through the case studies of U.S. arms 
transfers to the Arab League, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Arms transfer from the U.S. to the Arab League is the primary case 
study used for the same reason Saudi Arabia and Egypt were used as case studies in 
chapter two. The Middle East is a region that has been wrought with instability and 
conflict for many decades. Recently, this instability has led to changes in the governing 
parties of some strong U.S. allies in the region, including Egypt. When the independent 
variable being investigated is arms, it is logical to focus on how the transfer of arms 
affect regions that have not been or are not currently as stable, as there is more potential 
for misuse of arms transferred resulting in negative impacts on U.S. national security. 
The Arab League also has as its members, states that are some of the top arms importers 
in the world, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, because 
the Middle East is not the only strategically important region for U.S. military and 
economic security, and is certainly not the only region the U.S. exports arms to, the case 
studies of the African Union and ASEAN are also included. These regions are also 
important, as arms imports to both regions have increased in recent years and both 
regions also contain ongoing disputes, though their imports are not as significant 
monetarily.  
The case studies of U.S. arms transfers to the Arab League, ASEAN, and the 
African Union bolster the previous chapters’ conclusion of a net positive effect resulting 
from U.S. participation in the global arms trade. The ongoing sale of U.S. arms to foreign 
customers strengthens U.S. economic security by adding to U.S. Gross Domestic Product 
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(GDP). This in turn strengthens U.S. military security through the continued existence of 
domestic arms production and reduced cost of arms acquisitions for the U.S. military. As 
with individual alliances, the transfer of arms to regional alliances also strengthens the 
relationship between the U.S. government and the foreign purchasing state. The U.S. is 
able to shift some of the burden of ensuring security and stability to the region while at 
the same time bolstering relations in the region through demonstrated trust and military 
support through the sale of weapons. At the same time, as many regions around the 
world, including the Middle East, have a history of instability, the U.S. must do what it 
can to ensure that the weapons it sells are not used against it or its allies or misused in a 
manner contradicting U.S. foreign policy and norms including the support of democracy, 
human rights, and stability. The U.S. must also guard against unneeded proliferation and 
must maintain its own quantitative and qualitative military edge. The U.S. must also 
ensure that the sale of arms to regions does not lead to unwanted involvement in foreign 
conflicts and entanglements.  
There are evidently a myriad of factors that must be accounted for concerning 
U.S. involvement in the production and distribution of arms globally. Overall, the U.S. 
has benefitted economically, militarily, and diplomatically from its ability to maintain its 
status as the number one arms exporter in the world. However, it must not lose its ability 
to continue to benefit from the global defense trade while guarding against detrimental 
negative outcomes.  
As there are many factors and facets of the production and sale of arms, all 
aspects of the arms trade were not covered within this thesis. Given more bandwidth, 
additional case studies could be used to explore the question posed within each chapter, 
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which might in turn bolster the conclusion of each. Additionally, the exploration of arms 
transfers from other countries could be explored to examine whether arms transfers from 
other states have the same effect on that exporting state. Arms transfers from other states 
could also be examined further to ascertain their effects, if any, on U.S. national security. 
Left out of this analysis were also the various foreign military aid programs and funds 
that the U.S. government administers. However, additional information would likely not 
disprove any of these findings as the case studies used to investigate the impact of the 
globalization of defense production and arms transfers on U.S. national security focused 
on unstable regions with a higher likelihood of negative impacts. As these case studies 
yielded results demonstrating a positive net impact, it is likely that other more stable 
regions and less controversial arms production arrangements would also yield the same 
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Private sector economic globalization has considerable and potentially 
catastrophic effects on the national security of the Unites States of America (U.S.). The 
U.S. government can and should be aware of these impacts in order to take advantage of 
the positive effects of the globalization of traditionally national industries and reduce or 
avoid the negative effects. The U.S.’ need to reap all benefits possible from globalization 
is especially dire in light of the global economic slowdown and U.S. government fiscal 
issues. However, it is also critical that the government concomitantly safeguard U.S. 
national security.  
The globalization of the private sector defense industry, historically more of a 
national actor, has created a unique globalization issue. The two aspects of national 
security most impacted by this globalization are military and economic security. In order 
for the U.S. government to be able to address the impacts of the globalization of the 
defense industrial complex, it must know what those impacts are. This paper will answer 
the question: what is the impact of the globalization of the defense industrial complex on 
U.S. national military and economic security? This paper will further explore how has, 
and will this be affected by reductions in U.S. defense spending due to the end of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the global economic slowdown.  
The closing of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to severe cuts 
in the U.S. defense budget. “Equipment spending is already being scaled back... An 
advanced warship called the DDG1000 has been canceled, and an upgrade to the Bradley 
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tank called the Ground Combat Vehicle may also be scaled back or canceled.”13 In order 
for the U.S. to maintain its’ military superiority it must continuously improve its defense 
technologies while concurrently maintaining its weapons systems and platforms already 
in use. Maintenance costs alone can add up to quite a large sum. When defense 
companies’ profits are cut due to decreased U.S. government spending on maintenance, 
research and development (R&D), and production, companies are forced to seek profits 
elsewhere. In the global marketplace, defense companies can now seek to maintain levels 
of profitability by increasing revenues from sales and transactions abroad. Thus, while 
U.S. weapons systems and platforms stagnate and deteriorate, competitor nations’ 
military technology stockpiles advance and grow.  
“One of the consequences of the financial crisis in the arms-producing countries 
of Europe, North America and elsewhere has been reductions in military budgets. The 
resulting reduction in domestic procurement has created additional pressure on arms-
producing countries to significantly increase the export share of their total arms sale by 
seeking new export markets. While governments have long supported arms exports by 
their national industry, many major suppliers are expanding sales support in the form of 
government promotion and facilitation of exports, or the relaxation of arms export 
restrictions.”14 
One mitigating factor offsetting the outcome of reduced U.S. military superiority 
is globalization itself. Though globalization has allowed the marketplace for military 
                                                          
13 New York (AP), “Defense Industry Faces Profit Losses as Golden Decade Ends.” Huffington Post,  
October 15, 2011, accessed March 15, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/15/defense-industry-
profits-911_n_927596.html  
14 Siemon T. Wezeman, “SIPRI Yearbook 2014: International arms transfers,” Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2014/05 (accessed March 5, 2015). 
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wares to become global, it has also increased the interconnectedness of economies around 
the world. Thus, the economic downturn, which caused decreased U.S. military spending, 
also negatively affected economies around the globe. It was not only the U.S. that had 
less funds to allocate for military spending, but also its global competitors which suffered 
during the global economic crisis. Therefore, when the U.S. experiences an economic 
downturn causing it to decrease military spending, its competitors are likely to experience 
the same issues to varying degrees, thus potentially maintaining the same level of U.S. 
military superiority.  
The lessening of U.S. military superiority, however, does remain a potential long-
term threat that could result from the globalization of the defense industrial complex. 
There are numerous other potential threats that could result from such globalization. 
However, there are also a number of positive impacts that could result from this 
expansion of the defense market. The potential threats and potential positive impacts on 
U.S. military and economic security that could result from the globalization of the 
defense industrial complex are outlined below.   
DEFINITIONS 
Before delving into the topic any further it is important to define a few key terms that 
will be used throughout this analysis. The term “globalization” has become commonplace 
in many differing areas of study and in the media. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) defines globalization as “the growing interdependence of countries world-wide 
through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and 
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services and of international capital flows, and also through the more rapid and 
widespread diffusion of technology.”15  
The IMF definition provides a solid, general definition of the term “globalization” 
covering monetary aspects, transactions, goods and services, and technology. This 
general scope is important as the term “globalization” truly does cover almost every 
aspect of modern life. The internet has made it possible for individuals on opposite sides 
of the globe to communicate real time while looking at each other on screen. This 
communication could be described as an outcome of the globalization of 
communications. The internet has also made it possible for an individual to purchase an 
item from the other side of the globe with the click of the mouse. This action 
encompasses globalization of technologies, commerce, and capital flows. As evidenced 
by these examples, there are many different forms and applications of globalization.  
The IMF’s broad and encompassing definition provides an important base for the 
globalization of the defense industrial complex that is the focus of this paper. However, 
as this paper does not seek to address the general concept of globalization but rather the 
specific phenomenon of the globalization of the defense industrial complex, the IMF 
definition must be altered. Using the IMF definition as a base, for this paper, I define 
globalization of the defense industrial complex as ‘the growing interdependence of 
defense companies through increasing trade in military technology and defense services 
and the international transactions and capital flows that surround those, resulting in the 
diffusion of military technology around the world.’ I define defense companies as those 
                                                          
15 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May 1997, p. 45. 
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companies and corporations that produce, sell, and/or distribute military or defense 
related technologies and services. Now armed with definitions of globalization and 
defense companies, the proceeding analysis can be better conceptualized.  
POTENTIAL THREATS 
-Military-  
In addition to the stockpiling and advancement of competitor nation’s weapons, 
there are numerous current and potential threats or negative impacts that could contribute 
to the globalization of the defense industrial complex. The stockpiling and increasing 
complexity of weapons around the world, otherwise known as proliferation, decreases 
global stability. As technology is more widely available, it more readily makes its way 
into the hands of non-allied countries, individuals and/or organizations. These parties can 
use the technologies to develop countermeasures to U.S. weapons or use the weapons 
directly against the U.S.16 
The proliferation of defense technologies also has the potential to diminish the U.S. 
margin of military superiority as others’ military capabilities increase. The diminishment 
of military superiority decreases the ability of the U.S. military to defend the country and 
defeat others by the same increment.17 Military superiority allows the U.S. to not only 
                                                          
16 The Taliban has obtained weapons meant for U.S. and Afghan troops in Afghanistan. The Taliban have 
in turned used these same weapons against U.S. and Afghan troops as detailed in C.J. Chivers, "Arms Sent 
by U.S. May Be Falling Into Taliban Hands." The New York Times, May 19, 2009. This diversion of 
weapons from current coalition forces is not the first instance of diversion of US-origin weapons in 
Afghanistan to terrorist organizations. There have also been documented instances of US-origin 
MANPADS (Man-portable air defense systems) supplied to Afghans in the 1980s to fight the Soviet Union 
being diverted to terrorists. Daryl Kimball, “MANPADS at a Glance.” 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/manpads  
17 As China’s military capabilities increase and U.S. capabilities stagnate, the potential of U.S. tentacles of 
influence in Asia being cut off grows. While the worry is less that China will soon outpace the U.S. in its 
military might, its growing strength makes it more capable of pushing the U.S. out of the region and unable 
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win wars but reduce U.S. casualties; exemplified by the swift and decisive toppling of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in a mere three weeks by U.S. forces during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and the 2014/2015 U.S. mission to counter the spread of the Islamic State 
during Operation Inherent Resolve conducted solely via air power.  
The globalization of the defense industrial complex not only negatively impacts 
U.S. national security by diminishing its margin of military superiority and contributing 
to weapons proliferation, it also contributes to a loss of government oversight. As 
development and production of weapons have moved from the government to the private 
sector, the ability of the government to oversee and regulate weapons has been decreased. 
Oversight and regulation has been made more difficult through the international mergers, 
cooperation between defense companies, and the move of defense production abroad.  
As defense production is moved offshore, U.S. dependence on international 
procurement of parts and systems is increased. As dependence on other countries for 
weapons increases, U.S. military security is weakened due to reliance on the ability to 
import from other states. An example of this dependence being negatively impactful 
arose during 2014 when relations between the U.S. and Russia became strained after 
Russia’s foray into Crimea. The U.S. had become reliant on Russian rocket engines for 
its space program. The sudden strain in relations caused a scramble in the U.S. for 
alternative sources of engines which has continued into 2015, though arguably without 
                                                          
to support its allies. Henry Kissinger details this issue in “The Future of U.S. - Chinese Relations: Conflict 
Is a Choice, Not a Necessity” Foreign Affairs. March / April 2012.  
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any ‘real-world impacts.’18 In an extreme case, all stoppage of trade between the U.S. and 
its foreign supplier could cause severe damage to U.S. military preparedness.  
-Economic-  
As defense production moves abroad, the U.S. economy could also be negatively 
impacted by the potential loss of manufacturing jobs.19 This impact would be one that 
would negatively impact the overall U.S. economy. To a lesser extent, if the transfer of 
defense manufacturing continues to move abroad, U.S. defense companies and the U.S. 
government could also become dependent on the imports of parts and systems. This 
economic impact is lesser in terms of scale as it would have a more focused impact on the 
U.S. military industrial complex rather than the entire U.S. economy, though arguably not 
lesser in terms of importance. This result would also be detrimental to U.S. military 
security, as expanded upon earlier. Dependence would leave the U.S. at the mercy of 
foreign suppliers in terms of pricing and negotiations. This would be detrimental to U.S. 
companies’ profits and consequently to both the U.S. economy, and U.S. military 
security. If U.S. defense companies lose profits, the U.S. economy is negatively 
impacted. And if the U.S. were to go to war with a country that it depended on for vital 
weapons parts, its military security would be severely inhibited. Less drastically, the 
producing country could use U.S. dependence as a bargaining chip.    
Along with new dependencies, U.S. national economic security is also negatively 
impacted by the globalization of the defense industrial complex through its forced 
                                                          
18 Anatoly Zak, "Collateral Damage," Aerospace America 52, no. 8 (2014): 36-+. 
19 This claim is repeated in a Defense Executive Summary by the House Armed Services committee 
detailing the effects of defense budget cuts enforced through sequestration. 
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=f40c9c99-83da-4b26-b134-c0554bae4e05   
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increase of U.S. defense spending. Weapons proliferation caused by the globalization of 
the defense industrial complex is one factor that influences increases in U.S. spending in 
order to maintain military superiority. Other countries are able to obtain complex 
weaponry more readily which forces the U.S. to spend more on research, development 
and production of new platforms and systems in order to stay ahead.  
POSITIVE IMPACTS 
-Military- 
For every negative impact, the globalization of the defense industrial complex has 
a positive impact. Though weapons proliferation increases global instability, it also levels 
the playing field. In line with deterrence theory, globalization increases world peace and 
deters war at the same time.20 Countries’ avoidance of supply chain disruptions to avoid 
negative economic and military impacts is also peace inducing, as those supply chains 
now span the globe.  
As countries work together to develop new weapons systems and platforms 
through multinational companies, diplomatic relations and alliances are solidified and 
enhanced. Joint development, along with the ability of multiple countries to procure the 
same systems, result in increased interoperability amongst allies.   
Interoperability occurs with better technologies as market forces drive out 
inefficiencies by creating competitive manufacturing hubs. With countries working 
together more than ever in the pursuit of better defense systems, the resources of each 
                                                          
20 Christopher H. Achen, and Duncan Snidal, "Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies," 
World Politics 41, no. 02 (1989). 
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individual nation is increased as each nation draws from its allies. Domestic companies 
continue to supply the nation’s military, when they might have otherwise gone bankrupt.  
-Economic- 
Many of the military benefits of globalization of the defense industrial complex 
are also economically beneficial to U.S. national security including increased resources 
and the continued viability of national defense companies. As domestic companies merge 
internationally and partner with foreign companies, those companies, countries, and 
individuals involved are better able to achieve economic growth.  
International cooperation both in the private and public sector reduces duplication of 
efforts. The financial burden of the government itself is eased by shifting defense 
functions to the private sector and allowing for cost sharing between countries, the 
private sector and the public sector. Finally, production and processes become more 
efficient as market forces determine the best manufacturer and drive out inefficiencies. 
While all these positive and negative impacts on U.S. national military and economic 
security are valid, some are stronger than others. The case studies in this paper will 
demonstrate this uneven impact, showing that while a myriad of current and potential 
threats result from the globalization of the defense industrial complex, the positive 
impacts outweigh the potential threats. The maintenance of the domestic defense industry 
is one such overwhelmingly positive factor. However, it is important to acknowledge and 
account for all the effects and their levels of impact as the globalization of the defense 
industrial complex is a dominant and growing force.   
GLOBALIZATION OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION 
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The globalization of production is the latest step in the globalization of the defense 
industry, in great part spurred by defense industry profit seeking. Surprisingly there is a 
lack of material available addressing this topic. In fact, interest in the topic seems to have 
peaked in the late 1990s and then precipitously dropped off.21 It is surprising that there is 
not more study on the topic of the globalization of defense related production because of 
the national security implications that this specific form of globalization potentially 
entails; specifically proliferation and the diminishment of the U.S.’ margin of military 
superiority. In additional to these military security implications, there is also the issue of 
potential detriment to the economy. There are, however, a few reasons that might provide 
an explanation for the lack of interest in the topic.  
First, the globalization of defense industry production is a relatively new 
phenomenon, at least to the extent it occurs today. Though globalization of the defense 
industrial complex surged after the end of the Cold War, the production of complex 
weapons technologies and components remained a domestic endeavor.22 However, as 
nations and their governments have become more accustomed to and accepting of 
globalization, the off-shoring of manufacturing has also become acceptable. Although 
this development might be seemingly inconsequential as it has become commonplace, it 
can be detrimental to U.S. national security. Not only is the economic security of the U.S. 
potentially impacted by the possible loss of manufacturing jobs, but military security is 
also impacted when the manufacturing is defense related. “A much greater number of 
                                                          
21 Stephen G. Brooks’ "The globalization of production," Journal of Conflict Resolution (1999) and 
Richard Bitzinger’s “Globalization of the Arms Industry,” are two of the prominent post-Cold War pieces 
focusing on the globalization of production during that time.  
22 Elke Krahmann, "Conceptualizing security governance," Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 1 (2003). 
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items once supplied by U.S. manufacturers are now obtained from foreign suppliers.”23 
As manufacturing moves abroad, the U.S. becomes dependent on importing parts and 
systems from other countries that were once available in the U.S. The producing nation 
could use this U.S. dependence as a bargaining chip to alter U.S. actions in a manner 
beneficial to their country and potentially detrimental to the U.S.  
Second, the globalization of economies has proven to be a beneficial force for the 
individual nations who participate in it. Because of its positive effects on economic 
growth for those involved, enterprising countries, individuals, and corporations have 
sought to increase their reach throughout the globe. Jonathan Kirshner asserts that 
“Globalization does not impose openness; rather it raises the opportunity costs of 
closure.”24 Therefore, rather than having to pursue participation in the globalized 
economic market, wealthy nations must instead actively restrict their participation in 
global commerce if they wish not to participate. Globalization of markets has also 
become even easier to achieve with the invention of new communications technology, 
allowing individuals to interact globally without leaving their home or office.  
Third, the interest in the globalization of production seems to have peaked in the late 
1990s. This is in direct correlation with the bulk of analysis regarding what a new world 
order post-Soviet collapse would look like. After the majority of theorists concluded that 
the world was becoming more globalized, the debate turned to what this trend meant for 
the frequency of wars or lack thereof. Any economic globalization was accepted as fact 
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and a trend to continue. The U.S. implemented a Defense Trade Control Regime and the 
rest is history. Or is it? The globalization of the defense industry has continued to grow 
since the surge post-Cold War and is likely to surge once again due to current austerity in 
some of the wealthiest nations. Considering the past two decades of defense industry 
globalization and its’ current growth spurt, combined with new technologies that provide 
a seamless medium for information sharing, the globalization of defense production has 
more potential to harm U.S. national security than ever before.   
Though current analysis on the globalization of the defense industry is lacking, 
interest in the topic seems to be picking up within academic circles, made apparent by a 
number of new dissertations on the topic (see Beckley and Austin below). One reason 
interest in the topic may once again be gaining attention is due to increasing reduction in 
defense spending. Additionally, as was accepted in the late 1990s, the trend towards 
globalization has continued. Globalization of the defense industry raises vital governance 
questions. What are the national security ramifications of the expansion of defense 
technology production and corporate management to a global scale? It is a critical and 
instructive time to analyze how the globalization of the defense industrial complex has 
and will affect American National Security as it has been two decades since the end of 
the Cold War, just as the U.S. is ending military operations in two theaters and 
subsequently reducing its defense budget. The new reduction in defense spending is 
likely to once again spark a new wave of globalization in the defense industry, as it did at 
the end of the Cold War. However, it is now possible to look at the past two decades of 
globalization of the defense industry and its effects on U.S. national security, to infer 
what this new wave will hold for America.  
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In this paper I will lay out a comprehensive analysis of the positive and negative 
effects of globalization of the defense industrial complex on U.S. national military and 
economic security. I hypothesize that although severe negative repercussions result from 
the growth of the global industrial complex, the positive outcomes outweigh the negative. 
In order for the U.S. to take advantage of and amplify the positive effects of defense 
industry globalization it must embrace the phenomenon and regulate it to guard against 
its negative outcomes carefully as to not inhibit the good.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As previously stated, there is a deficit in current analysis and policy recommendations 
to guide the U.S. Government on how to address and benefit from the globalization of the 
defense industry. There is however a plethora of literature on closely related topics. 
Globalization is a popular topic in political and economic circles; however, it is a less 
researched topic in the field of security studies.  
Various factors have contributed to the globalization of the defense industry from 
what was historically a national industry. Elke Krahmann details these factors in 
“Conceptualizing Security Governance.” One contributing factor is the slashing of 
national defense budgets at the end of the Cold War.25 These cuts caused small and large 
defense companies to either go out of business or merge, often across borders.  At the 
same time, national defense budget cuts caused functions that were once performed by 
governments to become privatized. This privatization concurrent with the globalization of 
the defense industry has only increased in scope since the fall of the Soviet Union.  
                                                          
25 Elke Krahmann, "Conceptualizing security governance," Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 1 (2003), 16. 
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In "Globalization and the Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base," Terrence Guay 
raises additional contributing factors. Defense contractors’ need to secure contracts, 
according to Guay, adds to the globalization of the defense industry.26 Defense 
companies, as with any business, need to secure business contracts with buyers of their 
products, be that hardware or services. Post-Cold War defense companies had to secure 
the business from foreign buyers in order to maintain their profits. A common practice, 
called offsetting, has developed in the defense industry. Offsetting is when a company 
agrees to move some or all of the production of one of its weapons systems or some other 
hardware to a purchasing country in exchange for that country purchasing a certain 
amount of a particular defense system or defense service. Guay’s analysis of the effects 
of globalization concludes with his assertion that in order for governments and business 
to achieve continued success they must embrace the transactional interdependence of 
globalization of the defense industrial base. This is a claim that I will forward in my 
analysis as well.  
Guay also mentions the need for governments to address and enhance national 
security in the face of expanding globalization, an issue many authors do not address. 
Krahmann also points out the security and accountability concerns that have arisen from 
privatization and globalization. She suggests that individual governments can no longer 
“govern” the security sector on their own and must work with each other and private 
industry to maintain security in a system she calls “governance.”27 Once defense 
industries de-nationalized they were no longer under the complete control of the 
                                                          
26 Terrence Guay, "Globalization and the Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base," UNISCI Discussion 
Papers 19 (2009).  
27 Elke Krahmann, "Conceptualizing security governance." Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 1 (2003): 14. 
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sovereign governments in the nations in which they resided. Without the direction of a 
governmental body, defense companies can now function in accordance with market 
demands and fiscal profits in mind rather than for national security. The analysis 
provided by both Guay and Krahmann of the security issues caused by defense industry 
globalization lack breadth. Although both authors have depth in their analysis of the 
effects of defense industry globalization, Krahmann focuses solely on the governing 
accountability issues the phenomenon raises, while Guay does not address the national 
security implications of defense industry globalization in depth. The national security 
implication of defense industry globalization is an important issue that few authors 
address.  
As specific interest in security studies has not overwhelmed the field, literature on the 
topic is varied and often lacks a thorough analysis. Richard A. Bitzinger is one author 
that has provided a comprehensive analysis and outline of the globalization of defense 
production, the trends, significance, relevant U.S. governmental regulations and their 
limitations, shortcomings and suggested solutions surrounding this phenomenon. 
Bitzinger’s comprehensive overview, written in 1994, provides an informative base for 
analysis of the current state of the globalized defense industry. Bitzinger addresses 
important issues surrounding the globalization of defense production’s effects on U.S. 
national security such as “the diffusion of advanced military technologies and the 
establishment of new centers of armaments production.”28 Though outdated, Bitzinger 
provides excellent analysis on the subject of the effects of globalization of defense 
                                                          
28 Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge," 
International Security (1994), 171.  
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production and the limitations of U.S. government policies and regulations. Bitzinger’s 
main argument is that U.S. government policies focus on the short term profit of selling 
advanced defense technologies to developing countries, while ignoring the issues of 
proliferation that ensue.29 Due to these policies developing countries have attained 
complex weaponry. Bitzinger argues that the enhancement of developed nation’s 
weaponry is “bad” globalization; however he does not provide an explanation for why it 
is bad.30 Bitzinger’s analysis is pointedly focused on a “North/South divide” where it is 
ok for developed countries to attain complex weaponry but it is bad for developing 
countries to attain the same technologies. Though he repeatedly points to this as one of 
the most detrimental effects of globalization, Bitzinger never lays out his reasoning for 
why this divide exists, rather he assumes that it is a given that if developing nations gain 
advanced weaponry it is and will be detrimental.  
Bitzinger assesses that the U.S. is more affected by defense globalization “due to its 
superpower status, as well as its position as the world leader in military technology.”31 
However, as the paper was authored in 1994 and the political environment as well as 
regulations and policies have since changed, the paper as a source is outdated. Since his 
paper was authored, the arms control regime in Washington has gone through an ongoing 
transformation and re-organization. Even now the arms export process is currently being 
revamped under the Obama Administration’s Bright Line Initiative with the goal of 
easing the burden of the exporting defense industry.32 There is also a constant yet muted 
                                                          
29 Ibid, 195.  
30 Ibid, 196. 
31 Bitzinger, “Globalization of the Arms Industry,” 192.  
32 http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_027617.asp  
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discussion of creating one single agency to govern defense globalization and arms 
control; an idea that Bitzinger also raises. Bitzinger’s list of agencies with oversight over 
defense globalization, however, is no longer accurate. Though the Department of State 
and Department of Commerce are still relevant agencies, the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency was merged with the Department of State in the late 1990s.33  As 
Bitzinger points out, while there is still no one agency that oversees all defense related 
globalization issues, each agency involved has its own agenda.34 This remains true today. 
In general, the Department of Commerce seeks to promote industry and economic growth 
while the Department of State seeks to enhance diplomatic relations and the Department 
of Defense works to maintain U.S. military security and guard U.S. military technological 
superiority. Each agency has its place and provides an important balancing policy 
perspective.  
One method that has gained popularity in modern governance, in the pursuit of 
enhancing national military security, has arguably led to a further intensification of 
defense industry globalization.  Governments have been able to overcome smaller 
defense budgets by not only reallocating some defense functions to the private sector, but 
also by joint defense technology development projects. “Military alliances such as NATO 
have long embraced international arms collaboration in an effort to enhance intra-alliance 
combat efficiency and effectiveness.”35 Joint development projects, such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter, allow for a sharing of production costs between involved nations, so that 
                                                          
33 “Reinventing STATE, ACDA, USIA and AID,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 
18, 1997 http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/aboutacd/gore.htm  
34 Bitzinger, “Globalization of the Arms Industry,” 193. 
35 Bitzinger, “Globalization of the Arms Industry,” 174. 
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each country is able to get more with less. 36 In this case, the globalization of defense 
research and development (R&D) leads to greater resources, thus improving each 
participating nation’s national security. Thacker-Kumar and Campbell provide rationale 
for such collaborative action in their non-U.S. view of globalization. In their analysis, the 
authors recommend actions for the European Union to take in the context of globalization 
from a European prospective. These authors present the problem of European lack of 
technical innovation and a perceived lagging behind the U.S. and Japan. Their solution to 
this problem is collaboration between EU member countries in terms of research and 
development and production of technologies.37 Not included in this analysis is the 
downside of such collaborative ventures. The spread of R&D and production activities 
across borders creates an increasingly difficult process to regulate and secure (from those 
not meant to benefit). It must be noted however, that these authors focus their analysis on 
non-defense technological development. Therefore, the concern for national security is 
not as evident.   
Another European focused analysis, with a greater focus on security issues and the 
defense industry, is provided by John S. Austin. Austin, like Thacker-Kumar and 
Campbell, advocates for globalization as potentially beneficial to those involved. Also, in 
line with his European colleagues, Austin complains that countries are not taking 
advantage of the benefits allowable through globalization as much as they should. Rather 
than focusing on private sector technological innovation and economic gains like Thacker 
and Campbell, Austin focuses on the enhancement of interoperability with allies that joint 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 Joel Campbell and Leena Thacker-Kumar, "Fostering Inter-European Cooperation: Technological 
collaboration among nations of the European Union." The Social Science Journal 36, no. 1 (1999): 103. 
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weapons development has the potential to create. Again however, like Guay and 
Krahmann, Austin’s analysis, is pointed and lacks the breadth of analysis regarding the 
wide scope of effects the globalized defense industrial complex has on national security, 
focusing only on the benefit of interoperability.    
In the same vein, the globalization of defense production and corporate management 
has been argued by some to increase world peace and U.S. national security by creating a 
more even playing field. Stephen Brooks is one such author, forwarding the theory that 
globalization of defense industries is peace inducing. Brooks argues that global peace 
may result from globalization because of the vast networks interconnecting production 
chains between nations. Leaders of these connected nations, according to Brooks, would 
not risk disrupting the supply of components used in their military technology by starting 
a war.  Thomas Friedman echoes a generalization of this theory, expanding on Brooks 
writing, in his “Dell Theory.” Friedman hypothesizes that all cross border corporate 
supply chains are peace inducing because of the economic interdependence these supply 
chains create.  
Alternately, it can be argued that the globalization of the defense industry, including 
the globalization of production and corporate management is detrimental to U.S. national 
security. Gholz refutes Brooks’ argument in "Globalization, Systems Integration, and the 
Future of Great Power War." In his focused refutation of Brooks’ theory of globalization, 
Gholz seems to miss the nuances in Brooks’s argument, including that of globalizations’ 
effect on the quality of technology produced and the effect of collaboration amongst 
allies. However, both Brooks and Gholz focus on global peace, forcing them to make too 
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many generalizations to come to their conclusions and therefore leaving holes in their 
arguments. Bryce Reeder also argues that the globalization of defense production and 
increases in trade are detrimental to global peace in terms of decreasing global “stability.” 
However, Reeder goes a step further than Gholz and ties in this broader global stability 
argument into what it means for U.S. national security. In this paper I focus on U.S. 
national security. Once the effects on U.S. national security are determined, those results 
can be used to better infer broader world security.  
Jonathan Kirshner, like Bitzinger, provides a more thorough analysis of the 
globalization of the defense industry and its effect on U.S. national security. Kirshner, in 
his more current piece from 2008, states that globalization is not necessarily a new 
phenomenon, but does have new and important effects on the current structure of 
international relations and the power structure of countries.38  Kirshner addresses both the 
effects defense globalization has on world peace and on the security of the U.S. Unlike 
Gholz and Brooks, who take a hard line in favor of globalizations’ peace or war inducing 
properties, Kirshner concedes that both outcomes are evident and that different countries 
are affected differently by the phenomenon. Even focusing solely on the U.S., Kirshner 
shows both the power amplification and the increasing threats that are caused. 
As the U.S. has been the hegemonic nation in what became a unipolar international 
arena since the fall of the Soviet Union, it has maintained a vast lead in military power, 
including military technological superiority, over any other nation. Thus, while an 
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increase of military technological capabilities of any other country might help their 
security and could be argued to increase worldwide peace, it could be argued that the 
national security of the U.S. would be diminished. This argument follows from the fact 
that as others’ military might catches up to the U.S., the U.S.’ margin of military 
superiority diminishes, decreasing U.S. world power, and in turn diminishing U.S. 
national security.  
The case has been made by many that China’s increasing military power will soon 
rival that of the U.S. and consequently the overall power and national security of the two 
countries will be affected. However, few have made the connection between this 
projected future and the globalization of the defense industry. Michael Beckley is one 
author who, in his 2012 PhD dissertation at Columbia University, made the connection 
between projected military power and the globalization of the defense industry. Beckley 
argues that the U.S., as the most powerful country in the world, has been able to take 
advantage and skew global defense production and trade in its favor. By using its 
influence and power, his theory goes; the U.S. has been able to increase its military 
technological power relative to other countries. A rational continuation of this argument 
would be that by causing a marginal increase in military technological superiority, 
globalization of the defense industry has increased U.S. national security. Though 
academic work exists on the effects of globalization on the world and the U.S., and the 
effects of defense industry globalization on world peace or lack thereof, literature 
examining the wide breadth of effects of current defense industry globalization on U.S. 
national security is lacking. This paper addresses this gap in available literature. Through 
my research on literature related to defense industry globalization post-Cold War and 
36 
 
more current research on closely related topics, I provide a current framework detailing 
both the positive and negative impact of defense industry globalization on U.S. national 
security. Current research and policy guidance is needed as the trend towards 
globalization of defense industries has been an increasing trend post-Cold War. This 
increasing trend is likely to surge as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to a close, 
creating the same impetus the end of the Cold war had on the defense industry to 
globalize. Governments and industries must learn to thrive in globalization and avoid 
potentially baleful consequences including weapons proliferation and decreasing the 
margin of U.S. military superiority, as its reversal is not foreseen. 
DATA, METHOD AND RESULTS 
POST-COLD WAR GLOBALIZATION  
In order to derive both the positive and negative effects of the globalization of the 
defense industrial complex on U.S. national security I will focus the bulk of my analysis 
on the last surge of globalization that occurred just after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The two decades between the end of the Cold War and today allow for both a short term 
analysis of the globalization spurt that occurred just after the Cold War as well as the 
long term effects of that spurt. The case study of the end of the Cold War provides a wide 
variety of analysis on the effects of globalization as this was a popular trend in literature 
following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Political theorists were unsure of what a post bi-
polar world would look like. Many theories arose of how long or short a unipolar world 
would last. Looking at historical cases many theorists drew the conclusion that no one 
country could hold the bulk of power for long, as in the past, all great empires fell 
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eventually. Using the globalization of the defense industry and the proliferation of 
complex weaponry, political scientists theorized that as other countries, both developing 
and developed gained increasingly complex weaponry due to ease of access, those 
country’s powers would increase and thus increasingly threaten the power of the U.S. 
whose margin of military technological superiority would consequently decrease.39  
 These theorists however did not account for the enormous power and wide scope 
of military superiority the U.S. held. At no other time in history had one nation held such 
a great margin of military power above all others. In addition to this military superiority 
the U.S. also held a large margin of economic wealth and was able to allocate a large 
portion of its GDP or gross domestic product towards its defense spending. Even in the 
past decades as the portion of GDP spent on military spending decreased, the amount of 
U.S. federal spending on defense related expenses continued to surpass the spending of 
any other nation. Analysts often cite this wide margin of spending that is above any other 
nations’ defense budget with an insinuating undertone claiming that U.S. military 
spending is too high.  Although other nations have surely been able to obtain higher 
levels of complex weaponry due to the availability made possible through globalization, 
the U.S. has at the same time been able to spend money in order to increase the 
complexity of its weapons to an even greater degree, thus maintaining and even 
increasing the margin of its military technological superiority.  
As previously stated, the U.S. is currently planning on reducing its defense 
spending due to austerity sparked by the global economic slowdown and the close of 
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operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similar reductions in military operations and the 
resulting reductions in defense budgets occurred following the end of the Cold War.40 
Globalization of the defense industry surged following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
as a result of these reductions in military spending.  
Many defense companies following the Cold War either went bankrupt or merged 
with other companies. Defense industry mergers occurred not only within countries but 
also across national borders. Mergers that occurred were complex and often involved 
numerous companies. 41 While some companies did not partake in global mergers, many 
more companies looked to “offset declines in national demand by expanding into foreign 
markets.”42 The post-Cold War spark lit the flame of defense industry globalization; a 
flame that has grown into a fire, yet to dim.  
The globalization of defense industries now includes the existence of 
multinational corporations, technology supply chains for individual products that span the 
globe, joint development and manufacturing agreements, and the outsourcing of defense 
technology production.43 What was once an industry that produced sophisticated weapons 
technologies for its host nation’s defense, has now grown into a global force with 
tentacles reaching across the globe. “It was to safeguard governmental sovereignty in 
security that armaments industries were nationalized in Europe”44 as well as other 
nations, prior to the Cold War. However, in order to maintain military security and 
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maintain the existence of defense industries within each country’s borders, nations had to 
allow for the privatization and internationalization of defense companies. As the 
hegemon of the international relations arena, the U.S. has had the opportunity to help 
shape international relations and the organizations that oversee those interactions in the 
post-Cold War world. As such, not only has the U.S. had the ability to spend more on 
military weapons development and acquisition, it has also had the ability to govern, even 
if not directly, what weapons procurements other nations are able to obtain.  
Although the U.S., due to its power and standing has been able to maintain its 
margin of military superiority over other nations, it may have been able to do this in spite 
of the globalization of the defense industrial complex, and not because of it. In fact, “the 
pattern of recent years shows a gradual diffusion of the arms industry, with the traditional 
producers in the USA and Western Europe responsible for a slowly shrinking share of the 
Top 100 arms sales and the share of new players growing. However, the traditional 
producers remain overwhelmingly dominant.”45 As other nations increasingly produce 
arms, they are able to gain greater military capabilities. The U.S. is then forced to spend 
an increasing amount of dollars on research and development in order to maintain its 
weapons superiority. Due to the increasing cost of this maintenance the U.S. has had to 
come up with new methods of cost sharing with allies in order to deal with these higher 
costs. One method of cost sharing that gained popularity amongst U.S. allies in the post-
Cold War world is joint weapons development. One of the best examples of joint 
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weapons development is the Joint Strike fighter program. Joint weapons development is 
both a result of and a cause for further globalization of the defense industry.  
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER 
The Joint Strike Fighter program consists of a partnership between the U.S. and 
eight of its allies to not only share the cost of the new fighter jet but jointly design 
produce and utilize the platform. Lockheed Martin is the defense contractor leading the 
design and production part of the program on the industry side. This partnership is meant 
to reduce costs of new weapons procurement as well as increase interoperability and 
avoid duplication of efforts. The participating nations include the United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway.46 Each member 
nation has agreed to contribute varying monetary amounts to the program along with 
agreements for production of specific parts of the platform in varying nations. Each 
nation, having its own specific needs, has been able to design its own variant of the 
fighter jet. Although this variation might be seen as a positive aspect of the program, it 
can also hinder the interoperability piece of the venture.  
In addition to the production of parts in each partner country, each nation also 
participates in the sustainment, research and development of the aircraft. For example, 
although the software and primary engines for the F-35 are being developed and 
produced in the U.S., an alternate engine has been developed by a joint team of American 
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and British companies (Aircraft Engines of the U.S. and Rolls Royce of the U.K.).47 In 
addition to the joint development of this primary part of the aircraft, assembly lines for 
the F-35 include not only those located in the U.S. but also in the U.K. and Italy.48 In fact, 
Italy completed the first Joint Strike Fighter assembled outside of the U.S. in March 
2015.49 Italy is not only manufacturing its own orders of the aircraft. The facility in Italy 
will also assemble Dutch fighters as well as wing sets that will be shipped back to the 
U.S. for further assembly.50 The Italian facility will also continue to serve “as Europe's F-
35 airframe maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade center.”51  
In addition to production by partner countries, countries not participating as well 
as a growing number of participant countries, joining the venture through the Foreign 
Military Sales process, are also involved in the production of parts for the Joint Strike 
Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter supply chain includes “a production network involving 
two other principal partners, nine countries, 40,000 individual parts and several thousand 
suppliers.”52 Two participant countries include Israel and Singapore.53  “As of 2008, 
international content in the initial F-35 aircraft was approximately 20%, and Lockheed 
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expected international content to potentially expand to about 30% as the program 
transitions to full-rate production and the supply base potentially diversifies.”54 
Although each nation has agreed to contribute specific portions of funding for the 
development and production of the platform, cost overruns and organizational 
dysfunction have resulted in a process and product that is far from efficient. Funding 
issues are a constant hurdle for any large defense platform. New large defense platforms 
are increasingly expensive due to their increased capabilities. “In 2009, funding for the F-
22 fighter jet, a $65 billion program, was discontinued. Spending on the F-35 fighter jet is 
in danger of being cut back.”55 The F-35 was meant to be a cheaper yet more capable 
fighter jet in terms of versatility. However, the F-35 and all its variants are still in design 
and production, leaving the door open for cost-overruns.    
In addition to the issues of cost overruns, less than interoperable systems, and 
disorganization, there is also the issue of technological proliferation and leaks.  One 
reason that only eight of some of the closest allies of the U.S. participate in the Joint 
Strike Fighter Program is that each nation involved must trust with great fortitude each of 
the other nations involved in the venture. No nation involved could be suspected of 
potentially leaking the technology and data being developed or the final product itself. 
Though the U.S. and its partners seek stable and friendly relations with all other states, 
the fact remains that some relations are stronger and maintain a higher level of trust than 
others. However, the mere fact that a major U.S. military platform is being developed and 
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produced in a number of different countries and will also be in use by those countries, 
raises security issues that would not be present if that platform were designed and 
produced entirely within the U.S. Interestingly, this sort of cross border production is 
only one form of cross border co-production that exists. 
Joint Strike Fighter, as a government led program, likely has far greater 
government oversight and therefore potentially greater security requirements than cross 
border production agreements that private defense companies arrange outside of the 
government. Today, global production chains are becoming increasingly commonplace 
both in the commercial as well as the military sector. Many different components are 
often manufactured across a wide variety of countries with the end product or more 
complex and significant components manufactured or assembled in the U.S. Even in this 
scenario it is still possible that countries in which components are manufactured gain 
capabilities and knowledge they would not otherwise have had. The outsourcing of 
production also exports manufacturing capabilities and technical know-how the 
producing country may not have otherwise had. Obtaining this new technical 
manufacturing know-how could lead to the development of greater manufacturing know-
how and capabilities. This increased knowledge could then lead to the development of 
foreign competitor manufacturing hubs that could subtract from American manufacturing 
profitability and demand.  The offshoring of technical know-how and manufacturing 




Offsetting has become a common practice in the defense manufacturing and sales 
business. The U.S. Department of Commerce defines offsets as “the practice by which 
the award of contracts by foreign governments or companies is exchanged for 
commitments to provide industrial compensation. In defense trade, offsets include 
mandatory co-production, licensed production, subcontractor production, technology 
transfer, and foreign investment.”56 In their Annual Report to Congress on the impact of 
offsets in Defense Trade, the Department of Commerce provides a seemingly unbiased 
analysis detailing both the positive and negative impacts. These impacts include: 
“increasing the industrial capabilities of allied countries, standardizing military 
equipment, and modernizing allied forces” but also having the ability to “displace U.S. 
subcontractors, enhance foreign competitors and create excess defense capacity 
overseas.”57 Therefore, as with all other aspects of the globalization of the defense 
industry, the now common practice of developing and developed countries requiring 
offsets in order to agree to buy military goods from defense companies has both positive 
and negative consequences.  
The practice of offsetting, though potentially detrimental to the U.S. government, 
is beneficial to those countries that impose them. Though the U.S. government does not 
have an official policy guiding the application or acceptance of offsets, as evidenced by 
the Department of Commerce report on the practice, it does track its occurrence. Owen 
Herrnstadt argues in “Offsets and the Lack of a Comprehensive U.S. Policy: What Do 
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Other Countries Know That We Don’t?” that the U.S. government must form an official 
policy in order to take advantage of offsets for its own industries and manufacturers while 
also protecting them from the bad impacts such as increased manufacturing competition.  
Although offsets can have the effect of helping to create competitive 
manufacturing hubs in foreign countries, it is important to remember that the reason that 
the globalization of the defense industry surged and has continued to increase after the 
end of the Cold War was for the maintenance and growth of defense companies. It should 
also not be ignored that the globalization of the defense industrial complex did do just 
that. Though with the slashing of defense budgets after surges in spending during war 
time, it is inevitable that some smaller defense companies disappear through bankruptcy 
or mergers with larger companies, others are better able to weather the storm of reduced 
demand through their ability to merge with foreign companies, sell to foreign 
governments and private buyers, and manufacture parts for a reduced cost abroad. When 
U.S. defense companies are able to stay afloat through these or any means, the U.S. 
remains more secure than it would otherwise be without American defense companies to 
supply its military forces.    
CHINA 
Unfortunately the globalization of the defense industrial complex also benefits other 
countries that are not necessarily close allies of the U.S., including China. As the 
globalization of the defense industrial complex has expanded, developing nations such as 
China have been able to grow their economies by becoming competitor manufacturing 
hubs; including defense manufacturing. Although China’s defense manufacturing 
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capabilities are not as advanced as those in the U.S., a 2005 RAND study found that 
Chinese defense production was increasing its’ capacity for manufacturing increasingly 
complex weaponry.58 Data released in March 2015 by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) placed China as the third largest arms exporter in the world 
based on data from 2010-2014. This is a significant increase in status from its rank as the 
ninth largest arms exporter in 2005-2009. In fact, “Chinese exports of major arms 
increased by 143 per cent between 2005–2009 and 2010–14, and China’s share of global 
arms exports increased from 3 to 5 per cent.”59 As China and other countries increase 
their manufacturing, U.S. manufacturing jobs and profits are lost; impacting the U.S. 
economy.  
As China’s economy has grown it has increased its defense spending, growing its 
military and weapons capabilities at a blistering pace. According to a European 
intelligence official “The Chinese are throwing immense resources at their defence-
industrial complex … This is where the centre of gravity is in the geopolitical struggle for 
military dominance.”60 The expansion of China’s military as U.S. defense spending 
decreases will in turn diminished the U.S. margin of military superiority over China. 
Though this diminishment does not presently threaten U.S. national security, it does pose 
a risk to future security if this trend continues.   
The U.S. and China have opposing allies which sometimes places each nation on 
opposing sides. One dispute that China and the U.S. could potentially come to a head 
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over is the dispute between Japan and China over the ownership of the Senkaku Islands. 
While the U.S. has not stated its opinion on which country the islands rightfully belong 
to, the U.S. does have a treaty with Japan that outlines its military support of Japan if it 
were attacked. 61 If China were to increase its military might to the point that it was as or 
more capable than the U.S. military, China would have less reason not to act on disputed 
territories surrounding its shores. In this scenario, the U.S. might not be able to defend its 
allies as effectively as it has been able to since its rise to hegemony.  
Though China’s provocations may be more likely as it increases its’ military might, 
an all-out war is unlikely due in part to the economic ties between the two countries that 
have increased with the globalization of production. Additionally, “the U.S. and its allies 
have more than sufficient resources with which to balance China.”62 This ability, 
however, is increasingly tested due to the globalization of the defense industry; 
contributing to China’s ability to reverse engineer and develop countermeasures against 
U.S. weapons. With the proliferation of weapons that has occurred with globalization, 
China has been able to obtain the know-how and hardware to develop countermeasures to 
U.S. capabilities. According to a 2011 National Defense University study, China has been 
able to access U.S. aircraft including the F-16 and receive “completed subsystems” 
transfers from Pakistan, used to reverse engineer, design and produce copies of these 
systems within and for China.63 Such increases in foreign capabilities have forced the 
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U.S. to spend more on its defense research, development, and production so that it can 
maintain its military superiority.   
As China has alliances with non-U.S. allies, increases in China’s weapons production 
and know-how is troubling as the U.S. has no control over who China shares its defense 
information with or how China regulates and secures such sensitive information. In fact, 
“China continues to help Iran develop critical weapons programs.”64 
There are however deterrent factors that are partially caused by the globalization of 
the defense industrial complex that prevent war between China and the U.S. from 
erupting. China is the U.S. second highest trading partner and consequently an important 
buyer of Chinese goods.65 Therefore, any disruption of trade between the two countries 
would be severely detrimental to both U.S. and Chinese economies.  
RESULTS, EVALUATION OF RESULTS, AND CONCLUSION 
As detailed above there are a variety of both positive and negative outcomes that 
result from the seemingly ever increasing globalization of the defense industrial complex. 
Even the same event, action, or outcome can have both a positive and a negative side in 
terms of U.S. national military and economic security. Just as the globalization of the 
defense industrial complex surged after the end of the Cold War, the same surge will 
likely occur in the coming years as U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan come to a 
close. The Defense budget of the U.S. is already slotted for reductions due to U.S. 
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government fiscal issues and the close of U.S. military operations in two theaters. 
Defense budgets of U.S. allies, especially those in Europe, have already been greatly 
reduced. At the same time, nations that have not traditionally been as close allies of the 
U.S. have increased their military spending in recent years. Countries such as the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) considered to be the fastest growing 
economies in the world have increased their defense spending.66 The U.S. must be 
prepared to confront a new global marketplace where the defense companies that reside 
within its borders will have to do business with non-traditional allies in the developing 
world to maintain their profitability. This new factor will have to be confronted by the 
U.S. government in a way that will not only allow for U.S. defense companies to sustain 
profitability but also protect U.S. military security. It cannot be forgotten that the support 
of an existing U.S. defense industrial base is one that is necessary for both U.S. economic 
and military security. However, the U.S. will be forced to alter its current policies 
towards non-traditional allies in order to sustain the U.S. defense industrial complex in 
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RESEARCH QUESTION  
 Regulations surrounding the global arms trade differ from country to country and 
are perpetually changing within each state; including United States (U.S.) arms transfer 
regulations. Modern history is replete with interstate arms transfers. The arms trade exists 
under two avenues: legitimate channels which are regulated by the states involved and 
the diametrically opposed black market in which arms move through unregulated 
channels. When arms are transferred through legitimate channels they can simultaneously 
serve as a foreign policy tool. In fact, even if the use of arms sales as a foreign policy tool 
is not a priority, it can inadvertently signal a shift in the state of relations between two 
countries.  
 U.S. regulations and policies concerning arms transfers demonstrate the 
appreciation the U.S. government has for the impact arms transfers can have as a foreign 
policy tool. The International Transfer in Arms regulations of the U.S. government 
outlines policies and restrictions that the U.S. government mandates for the transfer of 
arms from private companies in the U.S. to foreign parties.67 These regulations include 
prohibiting the export of arms to numerous countries due to U.S. nonalignment with 
those foreign governments’ policies concerning human rights, democracy, and so forth.  
 The U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, a Presidential Policy Directive, lays 
out policy guidelines for arms transfers from the U.S. These guidelines ensure alignment 
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with what the U.S. seeks to promote, gain and inhibit in terms of security, alignment, and 
policies such as the promotion of human rights.68 This policy covers arms transfers from 
the U.S. that occur via both foreign military sales (FMS) and direct commercial sales 
(DCS). FMS are transfers of weapons or arms, technical data, and defense services from 
one government to another. While DCS are transfers of weapons or arms, technical data, 
and defense services from private entities to foreign persons or parties, including 
governments, private entities, and individuals.  
 The existence and implementation of these policies demonstrate Washington’s 
awareness of the utility arms transfers can have as a foreign policy tool. The extensive 
exchange between states necessitates the question: what are the implications of arms 
transfers? Unfortunately, this is a very broad question that can be interpreted in many 
ways and can have many different answers. To begin to answer the expansive possible 
implications, it is necessary to narrow the question further. This paper will examine the 
effects arms transfers have on alliances. In order to ascertain the effects of arms transfers 
on alliances, the case study of U.S. arms transfer to Saudi Arabia will be used as 
empirical evidence. U.S. arms transfers to Egypt will be used as a secondary case study to 
allow for counterfactuals.  
 Close examination of the alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia will be used 
to reveal how arms transfers are used as a foreign policy tool. The U.S.-Saudi arms 
transfer alliance will be used as the U.S. is the top arms exporter in the world and Saudi 
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Arabia is the second largest arms importer in the world with the U.S. as one of its largest 
suppliers.69 The U.S. and Saudi Arabia also have diametrically opposed governing 
structures and political mandates. Additionally, as there are so many factors that 
contribute to arms transfer alliances, an in depth investigation focusing mainly on one 
alliance yields a more in depth analysis than a shallow investigation of many arms 
transfer relationships. I hypothesize that arms transfers are used as a foreign policy tool to 
strengthen alliances, rather than inadvertently weakening alliances or merely bolstering 
the supplying state’s arms industry and increasing the arms stockpile and military 
capabilities of the purchasing state. The arms trade is not merely an economic or military 
transaction where countries buy and sell arms haphazardly.   
GLOBALIZATION OF DEFENSE 
 Global connectivity is extremely pervasive and increasingly permeates all aspects 
of economic activity and personal connections. This global exchange is not limited to 
individual needs but extends to larger collective entities including states. On a global 
scale, different countries have differing needs, but a universal need is security. Arms 
transfers fulfill this fundamental requirement and thus have exhibited the same trend; 
increasingly crossing all borders and economies.7071 Though the volume of major 
weapons systems transfers appears to be cyclical, there has been a noticeable upward 
trend overall since 1950.72 “Advanced weapons and technology enter global commerce 
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more freely than at any time in living memory.”73 
 Due in part to increased interconnectedness, states across the globe are emerging 
from a global recession that has affected most, if not all, states. The recession had 
significant impact on some of the wealthiest states, which in turn decreased the funds 
those states had available for defense and arms purchases. Decreased government funds 
in wealthier arms-producing states spurred an increase in the export of arms by defense 
manufacturers. Defense manufacturers turned to foreign markets, seeking to maintain 
profitability.74 This trend, combined with the drawdowns of U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, has unearthed how critical the understanding of arms transfers and their effects 
are to formulating an understanding of global stability. 
 The end of U.S. military operations in Iraq in December 2011, and the subsequent 
drawdown in Afghanistan, led to a planned reduction in the U.S. defense budget.75 
During these operations the U.S. defense budget ballooned, and the U.S. defense 
industrial base enjoyed increased domestic sales due to increased requirements. When the 
domestic defense budget shrank after 2011, many U.S. defense companies sought to 
maintain revenues via foreign markets. Reduced government spending raised concerns 
about the continued profitability of U.S. Defense Companies.76 The continued 
profitability of the U.S. defense industrial base is important not only to the U.S. 
                                                          
73 Kugler and Frost, The Global Century, 785. 
74 Ibid, 786, 790.  
75 Bill Heniff, Elizabeth Rybicki, and Shannon M. Mahan, "The Budget Control Act of 2011," 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2011, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41965.pdf 
(accessed November 30, 2014). 
76 House Committee on Armed Services, “Defense Spending Cuts: The Impact on Economic Activity and 
Jobs,” 
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=e417cd77-93f1-46c2-b63a-cd5ac72eb263 
(accessed November 30, 2014). 
55 
 
economy, as it is a large segment of the gross domestic product (GDP), but also to the 
U.S. military as its primary supplier of arms. 
 The health of the U.S. defense industrial base is profoundly important to the U.S. 
economy and U.S. military security. Consequently, Washington has been revamping arms 
export regulations and processes to ease the burden taken on by defense manufacturers 
seeking to export their wares.77 While this process began in 2009, it is ongoing.7879 The 
export of complex technology helps “promote American economic prosperity and 
competitiveness in world markets.”80 Due to the ongoing nature of the changes and 
apparent easing of restrictions, it is not yet possible to see the effect these changes have 
internationally. As the U.S. eases restrictions on arms exports, seemingly to protect 
economic and military security, it is important to understand what affect this might have.   
 Arms transfers have been a common occurrence for many years between many 
different nations and under many different terms. Determining how arms transfers affect 
global stability is a complex topic. In order to more thoroughly understand specific 
aspects of arms transfers, it becomes necessary to focus on distinct segments that make 
up the larger topic. This paper will examine the burgeoning consequences arms transfers 
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have on alliances.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Scholars have investigated and analyzed the cause of alliances with little mention 
of arms transfers. The effect of arms transfers on conflictual relationships has also been 
analyzed. Yet the effect of arms transfers on alliances has been largely ignored. The 
literature that is available treats arms transfers as a tool to enhance or create alliances. 
Notably, there is a lack of focus on the analysis of the causal relationship.   
-U.S. policy on arms transfers-  
 The paucity of investigation into the effects arms transfers have on alliances does 
not mean the topic has been wholly ignored. Shannon Lindsey Blanton comes close to 
addressing the effects of arms transfers on alliances in “Promoting Human Rights and 
Democracy in the Developing World: U.S. Rhetoric versus U.S. Arms Exports.” 81 
Blanton investigates the factors influencing U.S. government exports, specifically 
looking to match up U.S. government rhetoric with its actions and processes. According 
to Blanton, U.S. government rhetoric cites human rights and democracy as factors that 
are enhanced via arms transfers. However, in her analysis she finds that these factors are 
only initially prominent in arms transfers’ considerations, while other factors dominate 
considerations further along in the process; namely, U.S. troops stationed in country, 
relative peace, and geographic location. Blanton finds that if U.S. troops are stationed in a 
country, that country is more likely to receive more arms transfers from the U.S. 
Additionally, countries that are involved in active conflict are less likely to receive arms 
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from the U.S. Countries that are located in the Middle East are more likely to receive 
more arms if they have all other mentioned characteristics that lend themselves to 
receiving arms from the U.S. Democracy levels continue to be an important factor further 
along in the arms transfer process.   
 Though Blanton assesses arms transfers, she focuses on what contributes to the 
decision to transfer arms from the U.S. in terms of U.S. policies and rationale, rather than 
focusing on the effects once the arms are transferred. The effects of arms transfers on 
alliances and alliance relations are not addressed. Blanton emphasizes the pre-transfer 
portion of arms transfers, rather than international relationships and post-transfer effects.  
Kenneth Katzman is another author who focuses on the U.S. and its arms transfer 
policies in his Congressional Research Service Report “U.S. Military Withdrawal and 
Post-2011 Policy.”82  Katzman more narrowly focuses on U.S. policy towards Iraq, post-
withdrawal. Katzman’s report outlines assistance, training programs, and arms transfers 
from the U.S. as well as from other states. Like Blanton, Katzman considers projected 
effects and pre-transfer considerations, to include human rights and democratization, 
rather than analyzing the post-transfer reality. While Katzman provides relevant 
information to the topic of how arms transfers are meant to affect alliances, his piece is 
less academic and more policy oriented.   
Another U.S. policy-centric article is that of Andrew Shapiro’s in The 
Washington Quarterly. In “A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance,” Shapiro promotes 
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the enhancement of alliances and security partnerships as the U.S. leaves behind a decade 
of war.83 Shapiro details security partnerships, including arms transfers, as a means to 
enhance security. Partnerships have become increasingly necessary as the world has 
become progressively interconnected. This is significant to the U.S. because this 
interconnectedness has enhanced the effects that conflicts around the globe have on the 
U.S. Akin to the writings of Blanton and Katzman, Shapiro discusses projected affects. In 
this case Shapiro projects the enhancement of U.S. national security through alliances as 
an alternative to war, rather than emphasizing the post-transfer effects.  
-Arms transfers effects on the international system, limited to transfers to non-state 
actor- 
 Denise Garcia writes as a proponent of the prohibition of arms transfers to non-
state actors, via international agreement. Garcia overwhelmingly points to negative 
outcomes of arms transfers to non-state actors but tempers this claim by stating that some 
non-state actors have more peaceful missions than some states.84  
 Garcia’s claim that the current international system allows for wholly unrestrained 
weapons transfers is a gross exaggeration.  This exaggeration shines a light on Garcia’s 
bias. In large part, Garcia forwards an anti-arms trade policy perspective. However, 
Garcia does provide a useful counter opinion to pro-arms trade views. Garcia’s 
exaggerated claims display a lack of knowledge regarding arms trade restrictions.  With a 
deeper knowledge and understanding of arms trade regulations and restrictions that exist, 
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it becomes apparent that a complete ban on arms transfers to non-state actors would not 
only be unwieldy to accomplish, but also illogical. This is because, amongst other 
reasons, many commodities classified as munitions and regulated within the arms trade 
can be used for peaceful purposes. Though Garcia limits the subject of arms transfers’ 
effects to those transfers to non-state actors, these transfers are relevant to the topic of 
arms transfers as a whole.  
-Arms transfers’ effect on conflicts- 
 David Kinsella theorizes about arms transfer dependence and seeks to answer the 
question of whether arms-transfer dependence affects the foreign policy of so-called 
dependents. Dependents are states that depend on another supplying state for weapons. 
Kinsella hypothesizes that arms transfers increase the likelihood of the receiving state 
pursuing conflictual foreign policies, while dependence decreases that likelihood.85 He 
maintains that increased arms and military capabilities tend to promote conflictual 
stances by a state. However, if a state is dependent on one other state as a source for 
arms, this dependence tempers its posture; as the source state could cut off its supplies if 
the recipient were to become overly aggressive.  
 Though not directly related to arms-transfers effects on alliances, the discussion 
surrounding arms transfers’ effects on dependents carries over to the more general topic. 
A dependent could also be an ally. Kinsella discusses the establishment of relations that 
arms transfers generate as well as their impact on regional stability. A dependent could 
become an ally after or through the establishment of an arms-transfer relationship. 
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Alliances are also specifically discussed in the larger context of arms transfers. Kinsella 
concludes that countries seek arms-transfer relationships, at least in part, for the influence 
gained over the purchasing state. 
Krause addresses both alliances and arms transfers in his piece on the effect of 
arms transfers on militarized disputes. Krause theorizes that alliances with major powers 
reduce the chances of involvement in militarized disputes. Krause extends this conclusion 
to both ends of the spectrum: where the smaller state is the instigator or the recipient of 
aggression. Again, this scholar focuses on militarized disputes rather than alliances. Just 
as Sorokin implies in his article, “Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring 
Rivalries,” Krause implies that alliances and arms transfers are mutually exclusive. 
Krause treats arms transfers as an alternative to alliances. 86 This treatment is misleading 
as both methods of policy making are often used in tandem.  
 Gregory Sanjin is another theorist who analyzes how arms transfers affect rivals 
or conflicting relationships. Sanjin specifically looks at case studies in which arms 
transfers widen or narrow gaps in arms capabilities between rival states. He further 
explores how the narrowing or widening of the gap in military capabilities affects conflict 
versus cooperation between the rival states. Sanjin concludes that cooperative 
relationships generally remain cooperative with a widening of the gap, while conflictual 
relations improved with a narrowing of the gap. Additionally, Sanjin concludes that the 
intentions of the exporter are a contributing factor to the final outcome. He notes that the 
U.S. typically serves as a balancing power to narrow gaps in capabilities.  Though Sanjin 
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explores how arms transfers effect relations between countries, he focuses on rival 
relationships rather than alliances.87 
- The effect of halting of arms transfers on alliances - 
Lisa Martin analyzes sanctions implemented by a coalition of states. She theorizes 
that when sanctions are jointly implemented, they not only coerce their target, but also 
affect the countries implementing the sanctions. Martins’ analysis includes the assertion 
that when the initiator of sanctions is fully committed and willing to make sacrifices and 
take losses in the sanctioning action, that state is more likely to gain cooperative partners. 
Though Martin does not cover arms transfers or alliances directly, she does add an 
important aspect to the discussion, as arms transfers are often a primary target for 
sanctions. This form of sanctioning is included in Martin’s analysis, and her discussion of 
states cooperating in implementing sanctions could be seen as an alliance.88  
 In analyzing the effects that arms transfers have on alliances, one can also 
consider what the halting of arms transfers would do to alliances. More likely than not, 
and in concurrence with Martin’s well-supported theory, the cooperation of states in 
halting arms transfers could strengthen their alliance. This position also aligns with 
Walt’s theory of alliances forming in order to balance threats.89  
-Alliances as a substitute for arms transfers- 
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 Gerald Sorokin seeks to answer the question of whether alliances are used by 
states as a substitute for obtaining their own arms. Sorokin assumes that states have to 
choose between either buying arms or creating or strengthening alliances. Sorokin 
presents it as a given that if a state has ample arms, its alliances would weaken as it 
would not need allies as much as if it were arms poor, in which case its alliances would 
be strengthened through necessity.90 However, this logic is flawed because his premise is 
invalid. There can be countries with vast arms stockpiles and strong alliances and 
countries with little arms and few alliances. Even if the most common occurrence is for 
states to have one or the other, it would have to be supported by evidence and should not 
be presented as a given. The U.S. is a prominent example of a well-known counterfactual 
to Sorokin’s argument. The U.S. has ample weapons stocks and capabilities as well as 
many strong alliances.  
Sorokin’s analysis focuses on why and when countries seek alliances and/or arms 
rather than discussing the effect of arms transfers on alliances, as this paper seeks to 
explore. While Sorokin does not explore the effect of arms transfers on alliances, he 
implicitly concludes that increased arms would loosen an alliance as the paper treats arms 
stockpiling and alliances as either/or. Sorokin does not demonstrate this implicit 
conclusion with supporting evidence or case studies within his work.  
-The origins of alliances-  
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 Any analysis of any aspect of alliances would be remiss to leave Stephen Walt’s 
The Origins of Alliances, out of the discussion. Stephen Walt examines how and why 
alliances form. Walt argues that alliances form to balance against threats. He also 
expands upon his assertion that foreign aid is not enough to cause alignment. A common 
threat must also be present.91  
 While Walt does not focus on the effects of arms transfers on alliances, he is the 
pre-eminent scholar on alliances. Most other authors discussed here reference Walt’s 
work. Some authors even build their argument around reference to or refutation of Walt’s 
theories. Walt not only provides an important theory for alliance formation, but also 
thoroughly discusses alliances. Walt’s mention of foreign aid and assertion that it is not 
enough to cause the formation of alliances can be used in the discussion of arms transfers 
as government funded arms transfers are a form of foreign aid.92    
DEFINITIONS 
ALLIANCE  
As the premier theorist on alliances, whose work is referenced by most 
succeeding literature on the subject, it is logical to use Stephen Walt’s definition of 
alliances when discussing the subject. In addition to providing the basis for most 
literature on alliances, Walt also provides a general and therefore widely applicable 
definition of alliances. Stating that he uses the terms alliance and alignment 
interchangeably, Walt defines an alliance as “a formal or informal arrangement for 
                                                          




security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”93 This definition is 
appropriate in the analysis of how arms transfers effect alliances for the same reasons it is 
used by Walt himself.  
There are many informal alliances that have not been cemented by formal signed 
documents. In fact, many strong arms-trade relationships are not part of a formal alliance 
between two countries. One well-known relationship Walt references is that between the 
U.S. and Israel. Another such relationship, that serves as the main case study for this 
paper is the informal alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Another is that between 
the U.S. and Egypt.  
Many U.S. politicians and presidents have spoken about the unique relationship 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Jimmy Carter stated that “an attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any 
means necessary, including military force” in his state of the union address on January 
23, 1980. 94 This alliance, however, has never been formally recognized through a treaty. 
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have thus formed what can be described as a special 
relationship based on mutual interests, remaining undocumented through formal written 
treaty.  
The security alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S., especially in terms of 
the strong arms-trade relationship, is well documented. The U.S.-Saudi relationship also 
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fits Walt’s definition as an informal security cooperation relationship. Restricting 
alliances to formal signed treaty alliances would thus leave out many strong security 
relationships that involve heavy arms-trade relationships, such as the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship.  
ARMS TRANSFER 
 Just as it is important to define the dependent variable, alliances, it is equally as 
important to define the independent variable; arms transfers. Much of the literature 
available on arms transfers assumes that there is no need for “arms transfers” to be 
defined. This lack of definition leads different authors to discuss different transactions 
while on the surface assuming they are discussing the same event. Within the available 
literature, much discussion focuses on FMS, while not directly defining the transactions 
as such, but rather merely labeling them arms transfers.  
 As previously stated, there is more than one kind of arms transfer that can be 
delineated using useful U.S. government terminology. FMS describe the sale of arms 
from one government to another (government-to-government). DCS, on the other hand, 
describe the sale of arms from private companies to foreign parties. In the case of DCS, 
the foreign party does not have to be a government but can be an individual, organization, 
private company, etc. 95  
 FMS and DCS are the two most common methods of arms transfers but are not 
the only methods. The U.S. government also maintains an Excess Defense Articles 
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(EDA) program, through which it transfers defense equipment that the U.S. Department 
of Defense no longer needs or has in excess.96 There are also black market arms transfers 
where arms are transferred illegally, outside regulated channels.  
 This paper focuses on FMS arms transfers as the selling state has the most control 
over these sales and the recipient is a government (not a private party). However, as the 
regulatory structure in the U.S. allows for the U.S. Department of State’s regulation of 
both FMS and DCS, the U.S. government is able to stop or expedite any of these sales 
according to its foreign policy interests. Thus, in looking for how arms transfers affect 
alliances, FMS and DCS, as well as EDA come into play. In all of these cases, the state 
from which the arms originate has control over whether the transfer goes through or not. 
States with stronger export-control systems have more control over exports from their 
country. As black market arms transfers occur out of the control of the states involved, 
they do not factor into this paper’s scope of analysis.  
SAUDI ARABIA 
Saudi Arabia provides a good case study for investigating the effects of arms 
transfers on alliances for many reasons. These reasons are primarily based in the stark 
differences between the two states and the fact that the strength of the alliance rests 
mainly on arms transfers, oil, and mutually beneficial interests. First, the core beliefs and 
political structures in the U.S. and Saudi Arabia fundamentally differ. The U.S. is a 
democracy that was founded with the belief that politics and religion should be separate. 




On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy.97 Second, they are 
geographically seperated by a great distance. Third, since the late 1940s, when relations 
between the two states began strengthening, the pillars upon which the alliance has rested 
have been oil and arms.98 Consequently, arms transfers play a significant role in this 
specific alliance.   
Diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. were enhanced in 1949 
when the U.S. established an embassy in Jeddah.99 The establishment of a U.S. 
diplomatic presence in Saudi Arabia was just the beginning of a strong partnership 
between the two countries. Much of the discussion surrounding the alliance between the 
two countries focuses on oil. Saudi Arabia rests atop of a large amount of the world’s 
proven oil reserves, with “unmatched spare production capacity.”100 It is also evident that 
Saudi Arabia’s geographic location is central to many states that are highly important to 
the U.S. and it’s foreign policy focus.101 “The 865,000-square-mile kingdom, equivalent 
in area to more than one-fifth of the United States, sits astride one-quarter of the world’s 
proven oil reserves and neighbors two of America’s foreign policy hot spots, Iraq and 
Iran, and one of its closest friends, Israel.”102  
While the accepted reasons for U.S. interest in Saudi Arabia are oil and 
geographic location, Saudi Arabia has also sought alliance with the U.S. for security 
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reasons. “Traditionally the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia has been 
characterized as a basic bargain of ‘oil for security.”103 Shortly after the establishment of 
a U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia in 1949, the U.S. vowed to maintain stability in Saudi 
Arabia. Stability in Saudi Arabia was, and continues to be, considered vital to U.S. 
national security.  
Author Rachel Bronson maintains that in addition to these commonly accepted 
reasons, joint “geostrategic interests” are the basis for the strong partnership between the 
two states.104 Stability and security in the Middle East are vitally important to both the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia. These joint geostrategic interests brought the two states together 
in military operations again and again; for example, joining together against the Soviet 
Union, Iran, and Iraq during the Gulf War when Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded 
Kuwait.105 The U.S. made commitments to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraq and Iran.106 
However, from a U.S. perspective, though arms transfers have allowed for increased U.S. 
influence in terms of past basing and overflights, the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia as a 
security partner is limited as it has been reluctant to actively engage in many conflicts 
and joint operations in support of the U.S. One such example is Saudi Arabia’s 
opposition to U.S. Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
While location and natural resources may have been important contributors to the 
formation of the strong alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S., there has been 
significantly less investigation into how the two countries have maintained their strong 
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ties. What has contributed to the relationship’s strengethening despite important 
differences in the two countries positions on international relations and politics? 
Although the U.S. still imports a significant amount of oil from Saudi Arabia, the U.S. is 
increasing its domestic production. Keeping this in mind, if oil were taken out of the 
equation, would the alliance remain intact?107 What remaining factors would influence 
the relationship?   
One major sore point between the two states is their opposing views on the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The U.S.  is a strong supporter of Israel, while Saudi Arabia is not, and is 
often accused of raising funds for Islamic extremists. In 2010 Congress raised concerns 
that U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia could be detrimental to Israeli security. The Obama 
Administration assured Congress that Israel would maintain it’s qualitative military 
edge.108 Maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge over other countries in the region 
continues to be a policy of the U.S.; however, that may effect relations and sales to Saudi 
Arabia.   
The U.S. is also a democracy that seperates religion from its political system, 
while Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy. As evidenced by Bronson, the joint 
geostrategic interests of Saudi Arabia and the U.S. brought the two countries together in 
joint military operations, despite these fundamental differences. While Bronson asserts 
the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. has deteriorated since the end of the 
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Cold War due to diminshed joint geostrategic interests, she also asserts that all U.S. 
presidential administrations since Franklin Roosevelt’s have maintained extremely close 
relationships with the House of Saud.  
Although the threat of the Soviet Union has dissapeared, the two countries 
continue to have a joint interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East region. 
According to the Obama administration, the two countries have several highly important 
issues they are jointly working on: the crisis in Syria, nuclear nonproliferation in Iran, 
counterterrorism, and the Middle East peace process.109 Despite increased domestic oil 
production,in the U.S., the U.S. still imports a significant amount of oil from Saudi 
Arabia. Even if the U.S. did not import any oil from Saudi Arabia, the security of Saudi 
oil fields is vital to the stability of global oil prices due to the vast oil stocks those fields 
hold.110 Saudi Arabia has the largest proven oil reserves in the world.111 Furthermore, the 
two countries’ joint interests seem to have tempered their differences and have influenced 
each state to approach their opposing positions in a more moderate fashion: the U.S. 
working towards Israeli-Palestinian peace negotations through the Camp David Accords, 
and Saudi Arabia influencing other Islamic states to moderate their anti-Israel rhetoric.112   
As previously mentioned, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have numerous joint 
geostrategic interests. Bronson notes: “During the Truman years, the United States and 
Saudi Arabia initiated a series of military agreements that laid the groundwork for U.S. 
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training of Saudi forces (which continues today) and access to a military airstrip on Saudi 
Arabia’s eastern shores.”113 This arrangement both assured U.S. strategic access to the 
region as well as the security of Saudi Arabian oil fields. Though no U.S. military base 
was officially established other than the U.S. military airstrip in Saudi Arabia, there 
continued to be a U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia after the establishment of the 
airstrip.  
U.S. military presence increased to around 550,000 troops during the First Gulf 
War in order to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and to protect Saudi Arabian oil fields.114 
Around 5,000 U.S. troops remained in Saudi Arabia to enforce a “no-fly” zone in 
southern Iraq from the end of the Gulf War until 2003 when U.S. troops increased to 
10,000 for a short time.115 As Blanton suggests, it is possible that Saudi Arabia was 
rewarded for allowing U.S. troops in the country through increased arms transfers from 
the U.S.116 Significant arms transfers have continued even after almost all U.S. forces 
were withdrawn from the country and moved to Qatar in 2003.117 There are numerous 
reasons for the withdrawl of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia including the threat of 
terrorist attacks on U.S. troops, pressure by the Saudi population to remove U.S. troops, 
and the perception that Iraq was no longer a threat.118  
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Despite the removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia, military training 
arrangements and support continue. Initial arrangments made in 1951 between Saudi 
Arabia and the U.S. were based on the exchange of  financial and military support from 
the U.S. for “broad political backing for America’s activities in the region, outside the 
Arab-Israeli conflict” from the king of Saudi Arabia.119  
Additionally, in order to pursue joint strategic objectives, the two countries have 
developed a robust arms-trade relationship. In this relationship, Saudi Arabia is the 
recipient of significant arms shipments from the U.S., both via FMS and DCS. In fact, 
Saudi Arabia is one of the largest clients of U.S. defense products and services.120 This 
arms-trade relationship is one that has developed and grown over time.  
Significant weapons packages were agreed to and delivered under the Nixon and 
Johnson administrations.121 In the 1970s, the Joint Security Cooperation Commision used 
the sale of weapons from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia not only to benefit the U.S. defense 
industry, but also to enhance the U.S.-Saudi security relationship. FMS between the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia rose from $305 million in 1972 to over $5 billion in 1975.122 In the 
early 1980s, the Reagan administration, once again, looked to bolster relations with Saudi 
Arabia through a major weapons sale, in order to have a strong ally in the region.123 
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Between 1998 and 2005, Saudi Arabia ordered $9.3 billion in U.S. arms and received 
$17.9 billion in U.S. arms due to the delivery of prior orders.124 
Since the onset of bolstered relations with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. has tried to 
improve relations during lulls through sales of significant weapons packages. It has been 
presidential administrations in the U.S. who have offered these deals, while Congress 
often opposes them. As evidenced in a congressional report on U.S.-Saudi relations 
which states that “In late July 2006, the Bush administration notified Congress that it has 
approved over $9 billion worth of potential U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia. The 
109th Congress did not act to block the sales within the allotted 30-day period.”125 
Though in this instance the congress did not block the sale, it is implied there was a 
significant possibility. The authors also state that planned sales could be delayed due to 
concerns, specifically relating to U.S. support of Isreal. In the same vein, the Royal 
House of Saud has reacted positively to deals with the U.S., while it must simultaneously 
act to calm its public’s discontent with the cementing of close ties to the U.S. due to U.S. 
support of Israel and fear of Western ideological infringement.126  
At times, congressional opposition, due to concerns over Saudi terrorist funding, 
has significantly slowed down arms transfers to Saudi Arabia. One such instance which 
made a notable impact occurred in the 1980s. As a result, Saudi Arabia began to turn to 
other markets for its weapons, including Great Britain and China.127 It is important to 
note that though congressional concerns have been raised over arms sales to Saudi 
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Arabia, none have ever been fully blocked.128 Presidential waivers have been used to 
overrule Congressional opposition, as occured in 2010.129  
In order to ease congressional and public concerns over arms transfers from the 
U.S. to Saudi Arabia, proponents of the transfers have stated that, due to the robust arms-
trade relationship, Saudi Arabia has become dependent on the U.S. for the maintenance 
of its weapons.130 The Obama administration hopes that ensuring dependence on U.S. 
platforms ensures an enduring relationship through continued supply of maintenance, 
spares, training, and upgrades.131 According to this line of thought, Saudi Arabia is a 
“dependent” as described by Kinsella.  
Saudi dependence on the U.S. for maintenance, spare parts, and training is 
therefore an implicit lever that the U.S. could use to influence Saudi Arabia if it were to 
consider any actions not in the interest of the U.S., namely anti-Israel or any other anti-
U.S. ally military actions. With this logic, concerns over Saudi use of U.S.-origin arms 
against U.S. allies is somewhat alleviated.132 Saudi Arabia could turn to another arms 
supplier but a complete shift away from U.S. origin weapons would take a vast amount of 
time and money to accomplish.  
Saudi Arabia does purchase arms from other countries, though not to the same 
extent as it purchases from the U.S. or its close ally, the U.K.133 It is possible that Saudi 
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Arabia is hedging against complete dependence on U.S. weapons. It is also possible that 
Saudi Arabia is purchasing from other states because of better pricing, products, or 
availability. Saudi Arabia could also be purchasing arms from other states to build 
diplomatic relations with those countries, just as it has with the U.S. It is important to 
note here that Saudi Arabia tends to purchase arms from close allies of the U.S., such as 
NATO countries and the UK, when it is not purchasing directly from the U.S.134  
Although Saudi Arabia does purchase arms from other states, aside from the UK, 
it continues to purchase the majority from the U.S.135 Both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. 
continue to share strategic interests in the region where Saudi Arabia rests. With those 
shared strategic interests, such as stability, counterterrorism, and interests in Iran, Syria, 
and Iraq, the two countries have continued their arms arrangments.136 Saudi Arabia is 
currently the largest recipient of FMS initiated in the U.S., "with active and open cases 
valued at approximately $97 billion.”137 In 2010 Congress was notified of a proposed 
sales package including F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia worth approximately $60 
billion. This FMS case is the largest single FMS case to date.138   
Cyclical trends in arms sales from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia are also affected by 
Saudi finances. For example, in the decade following the mid 1990s, there was a 
downward trend in such arms transfers due to weakened Saudi finances. Weakened Saudi 
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finances were in part due to debts incurred during the Gulf War. This trend reversed 
course in the mid 2000s due in part to improving Saudi finances.139 In fact, Saudi Arabia 
was the fifth highest arms importer in the world from 2009-2013 according to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).140 Saudi Arabia has since 
become the second largest arms importer in the world, according to SIPRI data from 
2010-2014.141 The U.S. was the number one arms exporter during the same periods.142 
This upward trend can also be attributed to increased joint counterterrorism operations 
and regional instability.143 Joint counterterrorism operations between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia include those countering al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or 
ISIL. From October 2010 through February 2014, “Congress was notified of proposed 
sales to Saudi Arabia of fighter aircraft, helicopters, missile defense systems, missiles, 
bombs, armored vehicles and related equipment and services, with a potential value of 
more than $86 billion.”144  
It is important to note that arms transfers take some time to negotiate and develop, 
often leaving a long lag time to be accounted for when looking for a correlation between 
operations, threats, and arms transfers. A potentially stronger correlation might be Saudi 
threat perception and anticipation of future conflict and arms orders. Given these 
contingencies, Saudi Arabia has had concerns about Iran, Iraq, and Syria for some time, 
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which may have led to the recent large U.S. arms deal with Saudi Arabia. The U.S. has 
agreed to supply 1.75 billion dollars worth of Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia.145 
Demonstrating the positive effects of large arms sales such as this one on U.S. industry, 
the two defense companies involved, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, both had their 
stocks reach their highest levels ever; likely as a result of the deal.146  
The uncertainty and threat of ISIL to states in the Middle East, including Saudi 
Arabia, may also be contributing to increases in Saudi defense spending. At the same 
time the U.S. and its European allies have continued to decrease defense spending. As 
ISIL’s stated mission is to create an Islamic calaphate encompassing all of Syria, Iraq, 
and the Levant, it threatens not only the states in which it is currently operating, but the 
entire region.147 Thus, though the threat of ISIL is an unfortunate fact, the joint strategic 
interest in defeating this terrorist organization is beneficial to the U.S.-Saudi alliance, the 
U.S. defense industrial base, and Saudi arms coffers. Despite spending large amounts of 
money on weapons systems, Saudi Arabia is still unable to defend itself against major 
threats without the help of the U.S. and its allies.148 Saudi Arabia continues to require 
U.S. support to build an effective military, service and maintain weapons, and defend 
itself.149 As instability and security threats continue to plague Saudi Arabia and the 
Persian Gulf states, this requirement will persist.  
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Christopher Blanchard, a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, describes the 
security-cooperation relationship, enhanced by and including arms transfers, as the 
anchor of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.150 The security 
relationship that has been developed over the last 50 years includes arms transfers, 
training, and cooperation. This security-cooperation relationship has created ties between 
the two states that would be extremely difficult and costly to break.151  
Arms transfers not only provide literal support for security cooperation between 
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, but also provide a symbolic commitment by both parties to the 
alliance.  The alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia began, in the most basic sense, 
as one that can be described as oil for security. However, over the years the two states 
have come together ideologically and logistically on many mutual security challenges. 
The growth in mutual security challenges has bolstered the relationship. This 
strengthening of alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. would not have occured 
were it not for the significant transfer of arms between the two countries. The release of 
advanced systems enhance the alliance as Saudi Arabia places a high value on the 
deterent effect arms provide and indicate the strength of U.S. commitment to Saudi 
security and the bilateral relationship.152  
The significant arms transfers from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia that have occurred 
over many decades demonstrate that arms transfers can and are used to bolster 
alliances.153 The sale of arms from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia has ensured that the trade 
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relationship in which the U.S. established itself as a significant purchaser of Saudi 
Arabian oil was not one sided. This mutually dependent relationship was then enhanced 
by mutual-security interests. Although it is never possible to accurately predict how a 
relationship would have varied if the past were different, it is unlikely that the alliance 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would have developed into such a strong alliance if 
not for the significant arms transfers from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia. Thus, this case study 
supports the hypothesis that arms transfers bolster or strengthen alliances.  
Stephen Walt describes the formation of alliances as being primarily caused by 
the need to balance against other states. Walt’s definition and analysis of why states form 
alliances fits extremely well with the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. 
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have maintained an informal arrangement for security 
cooperation since the 1940s. The alliance between these two states was formed in part to 
balance against mutual threats in the Middle East. 
The trade relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S., primarily consisting of 
oil for arms, has strengthened their alliance. Both states’ economic and military security 
has been strengthened by this trade relationship. Each state can and has used its exports 
as a tool to influence and shape the actions of the other state and the alliance as a whole. 
As exemplified by the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, arms transfers 
enhance alliances.  
EGYPT 
As with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the core beliefs and poltical cultures in Egypt 
and the U.S. also differ greatly despite a long and robust arms trade relationship. In 
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addition to latent disperate cultures and values, recent instability within Egypt has put 
further strain on the U.S.-Egypt relationship. President Hosni Mubarak held autocratic 
rule over Egpyt from 1971-2011.154 While the Arab Spring protests in 2011 strived to end 
the repression present under the autocratic leadership of President Hosni Mubarak, the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s following rule under Mohamed Morsi continued this 
repression.155 Although Morsi continued to govern through repression, he was the first 
democratically elected President of Egypt, democtratic elections being a value that the 
U.S. strongly upholds.156 Morsi, however, was overthrown in a military coup shortly after 
his election in 2012 by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who then ran for and was elected as 
the new President of Egypt in June 2014.157 Given this recent internal instability, Egypt’s 
relationship with the U.S., especially in terms of its receipt of U.S. arms has consequently 
been restrained.158  
Following the Camp David Accords of 1978, Egypt had been one of the largest 
recipients of U.S. foreign military aid in the world.159 However, section 7008 of the U.S. 
Consolidated Appropriations Act forbids direct foreign assistance to countries which 
have had democratically elected officials deposed by military coups.160 This U.S. 
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legistlation embodies the U.S. principle of democratic governance, one that the U.S. 
promotes around the world. Military coups also fly in the face of not only democratic 
governance, but also call into question the U.S. values of human rights and regional 
stability. Thus, not only foreign assistance writ large, but the U.S. arms transfer 
relationship with Egypt was put in question after the military coup desposing Morsi, 
though the U.S. has never officially acknowledged this coup.  
Most importantly, after succesive changes in leadership and governing parties in 
Egypt, the U.S. must determine whether the new ruling parties align with U.S. interests. 
U.S. transfer of complex weapon systems to the state would be questionable were Egypt 
not aligned with U.S. interests, especially as it is located in  such a votalite region. It was 
after all the Camp David Accords, and Egypts agreement to work towards peace with 
Israel, that expanded Egypt’s relationship with the U.S.161 If new leadership were to 
reject continued peace with Israel, the U.S. would likely cut assistance and military 
transfers to Egypt. Fortunately, this extreme action has not been required as of yet.  
As the Egyptian-Israeli peace, that was prompted with the Camp David Accords, 
continues, Egypt continues to remain a strong ally of the U.S. With few other Israeli 
allies with whom to partner in the region, the U.S. continues to uphold its strategic 
alliance with Egypt despite Egypt’s recent internal turmoil. In fact, in 2014 the U.S. 
delivered 10 combat helicopters to Egypt.162 The U.S. continues to be the top exporter of 
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arms to Egypt.163 Between 2000 and 2011, the U.S. exported F-4 jets, F-16 fighter jets, 
M-60A3 and M1A1 combat tanks, APCs, Apache helicopters, anti-aircraft missile 
batteries, aerial surveillance aircraft, amongst other arms, to Egypt.164 Prior to 1976 the 
U.S. had few arms exports to Egypt, however, in the lead up to the signing of the Camp 
David Accords, the U.S. began large arms shipments to Egypt.165 Since 1976, exports of 
arms from the U.S. have only grown, with 22,748 million dollars USD in sales to Egypt 
since 1950, a quarter of which have taken place since 2000. Between 2000 and 2013, 
5,641 million dollars USD of arms were transferred from the U.S. to Egypt.166  
As with Saudi Arabia, robust U.S. arms transfers to Egypt have allowed for the 
U.S. to use the threat of an end to those arms transfers as a negotiating tool through 
which it can influence Egypt. While, as with Saudi Arabia, Egypt could turn to other 
arms suppliers, Egypt would lose its ability to maintain the vast amounts of weaponry it 
has already obtained from the U.S. if it were to do so. Additionally, as it has set itself 
apart from other Arab states in the region through its treaty with Israel, Egypt has an 
interest in maintaining its arms trade alliance with the U.S. in order to maintain its 
military capabilities. As with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and Egypt also share the joint 
strategic interests in the Middle East of regional stability, counterterrorism, and 
maintaining peace with Israel.  
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The U.S.-Egypt arms trade alliance is both vital to U.S. strategic interests in the 
Middle East, especially in its support of Israel, and to Egypt’s security in the region, 
maintaining its own national security and buffering against the threat of instability from 
other states and non-state actors in the region. The arms trade relationship between the 
U.S. and Egypt allows for physical as well as symbolic support for each others strategic 
interests and physical security. As arms transfers from the U.S. to Egypt have been used 
over the past few decades to cement this strategic alliance, the U.S. must ensure that with 
the recent changes in Egyptian governance, Egypt continues to align with U.S. interests. 
With this historic arms trade relationship in place, the U.S. is better able to ensure that 
new Egyptian leadership aligns with U.S. interests than if this arms trade relationship 
were not present. Not only can the U.S. use its arms trade relationship with Egypt to 
ensure the health of its strategic interests in the Middle East, but arms sales to Egypt 
strengthen the U.S. economy through contributions to U.S. GDP as well as strengthening 
U.S. military security through the reduced threat of its military being drawn into 
increased instability in the Middle East, a strategically important region for the U.S. 
Thus, the arms trade relationship between the U.S. and Egypt not only enhance their 
alliance but benefit each country individually.  
CONCLUSION 
Though Robert Art speaks of America’s forward defense posture, his conclusion 
regarding its benefits is equally applicable to the effects of arms transfers on alliances. 
The transfer of arms “deters adverse military actions; it reassures key regional actors and 
thereby buffers regions from destabilizing influences; it enhances regional security 
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cooperation and management; and it facilitates waging war should that become 
necessary.”167 All of these outcomes positively impact all parties within the alliance.  
Arms transfers bolster alliances through the exporting state showing a willingness 
to share military technologies. In sharing military technologies, the state transfering the 
arms demonstrates its trust in the recipient. The exporting state also demonstrates a 
willingness to work with the recipient and support its security needs. At the same time, 
the recipient state demonstrates its alignment with the exporting state, in that it is 
choosing to purchase arms from said state, rather than any other supplying country.  
Transfering a large quantity of highly capable and significant military equipment 
to another country demonstrates trust in the receiving state in such a fashion that should 
not be ignored. States, especially those with significant defense budgets such as the U.S., 
strategically build their weapons systems so that they are able to achieve technological 
superiority over any potential enemies.168 When the U.S. allows for the export of some of 
its highly capable and sensitive military technology, it does so selectivley. When one 
state is the recipient of a large quantity of the highly capable or sensitive military 
technologies that originate from the U.S., it is evident that the U.S. trusts the recipient to 
not use those same arms against the U.S. or its allies.  
Another reason that an arms exporter would export its own technologically 
superior weapons to other states is to ensure interoperability with the recipient state. 
Ensuring interoperability demonstrates mutual security interests. Without interoperability 
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it would be significantly more difficult for countries to come together to fight against 
mutual enemies.  
At the same time, the possibility that the recipient state is seeking to build up its 
arms in order to lessen dependence and detract from the alliance with the exporting state 
should not be ignored. The exporting state should ensure that it does not solely rely on a 
single state in any one region for influence and policy support. However, the build up in 
arms of the receiving state allows the recipient some ability to defend itself and not rely 
completely on the exporter to come to its defense. In a time when the U.S. has plans to 
decrease its defense spending and seeks to reduce military engagement abroad, the build 
up of allies’ military capabilities moves towards a less dependent relationship, potentially 
benefitting both states when countering security threats.  
In conclusion, arms transfers strengthen alliances by demonstrating trust between 
the allied partners, solidifying mutual security interests, supporting mutual balancing 
activities, creating interoperability on the battlefield, and increasing each individual 
states’ economic and military security. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The strengthening of alliances through arms transfers is a conclusion drawn from 
the main case study of the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S., with a secondary 
look at the alliance between the U.S. and Egypt. These case studies could be explored 
further to include an investigation of historical events and large arms transfers in order to 
ascertain any correlation. Another important aspect of the U.S.-Saudi relationship is oil 
and any impact its price and trade has on arms transfers, alliance, and conflict.  
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In order to further support this conclusion, additional case studies should be 
investigated. Another case study that would likely support this conclusion would be the 
alliance between Israel and the U.S., which also includes a large quantity of arms 
transferred from the U.S. However, in order to strengthen the conclusion even more, the 
inclusion of dissimilar case studies should be taken into account. 
Alternatively, the larger picture could be investigated; analyzing how arms 
transfers in general affect alliances, to include allied parties not directly involved in the 
transactions at hand. For example, how do arms transfers between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia effect the U.S.-Israel alliance? How do arms transfers between the U.S. and Israel 
affect the U.S.-Saudi alliance? How do arms transfers from the U.S. to the UK affect 
NATO? Investigation of these and other possible case studies could lend further support 


















ARMS TRANSFERS AND REGIONAL ALLIANCES: GUARDING GLOBAL 



















RESEARCH QUESTION  
 Scholars have investigated how arms sales affect rivalry, conflict, regional 
military balance, and the duration of war. Given the role of weapons in war, it is only 
logical that scholarly trends follow these avenues of inquiry. The majority of security 
threats are regional, correspondingly focus on regional balance, regional rivalry, and 
regional conflict is important.169 The effects of arms transfers on regional alliances and 
relationships that are not in the midst of conflict, have been largely overlooked in 
academia, despite being a critical consideration when engaging in arms trade. Regions 
and alliances do not exist in a static world; alliances are dynamic political relationships 
that are subject to change. The severity of change in political relationships can be mild to 
severe possibly resulting in creation of conflict. It is this unpredictable nature that must 
be taken into consideration when committing to large and sophisticated arms deals. Arms 
transfers have the potential for inflaming conflict, sparking an arms race, detrimentally 
effecting regional relations, or weakening a friendly regional alliance. It is of integral 
importance to investigate and analyze what, if any, effects arms sales have on regional 
alliances and relations for the same reasons. Arms producers and sellers should note the 
potential effects their wares may have on the regions that are purchasing the arms.  
  The United States (U.S.), as the top arms exporter in the world, must be cognizant 
of all of the potential effects its arms exports have on regions to which it exports to  in 
order to safeguard against unnecessary negative consequences. This paper seeks to 
                                                          




analyze the effects arms transfers have on regional alliances and inter-state relations and 
how these, in turn, impact the country where the arms originated. “World military 
expenditure in 2013 is estimated to have been $1747 billion, representing 2.4 per cent of 
global gross domestic product or $248 for each person alive today. The total is about 1.9 
per cent lower in real terms than in 2012.”170 Though immense, this figure exhibits a 
slight reduction in world military expenditure. A closer examination reveals that it is 
expenditure in the west that has gone down while military spending elsewhere has 
increased.171 More specifically, the U.S., Australia, Western Europe and the countries 
within the surrounding regions have reduced their military expenditure, while regions 
such as the Middle East, Africa and Asia have increased military expenditure.   
 The Arab League is used as the main case study central to determining what, if 
any, are the effects that arms transfers have on regional relationships and in turn on the 
original exporting state. “The Middle East remains an important market as it continues to 
maintain the highest burden in military expenditure, at around 5%-6% of overall 
GDP.”172 In 2013 the Middle East spent 150 billion dollars on military expenditures.173 
As the member states within the Arab League continue to increase their military 
expenditures and imports of sophisticated weaponry, the Arab League constitutes a 
vibrant and important case study. “Arms imports to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states increased by 71 per cent from 2005–2009 to 2010–14…mainly with arms from the 
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U.S. and Europe.”174 This drastic increase is important to the ongoing discussion because 
all members of the GCC are also members of the Arab League. When intersecting the 
high value of arms acquisitions made in the Middle East with the religious, ethnic and 
environmental disputes that riddle the region, the Arab League provides a provocative 
case study to investigate the effects that arms transfers have.  
 To supplement findings from the main case study of the Arab League, analysis of 
arms imports to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African 
Union will provide a comparison point and validate the strength of the original findings. 
These case studies will inevitably be less detailed as the countries within these regional 
alliances have less buying power compared to the countries that make up the Arab 
League. In 2013 Africa’s military spending totaled 44.9 billion, while military spending 
in Southeast Asia totaled 35.9 billion.175 This clearly indicates that arms exports to 
countries belonging to ASEAN and the African Union are not as great as those to 
countries that belong to the Arab League. At the same time, between 2005–2009 and 
2010–14, African arms imports increased by 45% and “Asian countries continue(d) to 
expand their military capabilities.”176 Thus, despite the fact that arms imports within the 
African Union and ASEAN are not as extensive as arms imports within the Arab League, 
arms imports within the African Union and ASEAN are experiencing a significant 
growing trend. 
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 At the same time, countries within ASEAN and the African Union, while 
important to U.S. national security, have not exhibited the stark change in alignments 
combined with counter-U.S. military action that Arab League countries have 
demonstrated. The fluid nature of alliances and the unpredictable ebb and flow of conflict 
in the Middle East has provided several historical lessons. In fact, several countries in the 
Middle East provide examples of states that were previously aligned with U.S. interests 
and correspondingly received large amounts of arms from the U.S. during the time of 
alignment. However, as a result of a precipitous change in course those same arms 
provided by the U.S. were used against U.S. military forces. This exhibits the instability 
and changing nature of alliances in the Middle East, amongst individual countries within 
the Middle East, and their established relationships with the U.S.  
 Other regional alliances such as the European Union, Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the Australia, New Zealand, U.S. Security Treaty (ANZUS) will not be 
used as case studies due to their relative stability, decreased military spending by some, 
and close alignment with U.S. interests. The high degree of alignment between the U.S. 
and these states is made clear by U.S. membership in OAS and ANZUS.  By analyzing 
how U.S. arms exports to the Arab League, ASEAN, and the African Union affect those 
regional alliances and in turn U.S. national security, this chapter will demonstrate a net 
positive affect of U.S. arms transfers to regional alliances on U.S. national security.  
GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITY 
 The arms trade is a complex business. It is a business that necessitates strategy, 
control, and the ability to understand the ramifications that extend beyond each individual 
arms deal to all possible consequences. With the increasing pervasiveness of global 
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communication and coordination, the reach of arms deals have precipitously expanded. 
Though the arms trade is not a new phenomenon and has tended to be cyclical in nature, 
there has been a noticeable upward trend in the past decade.177 Concurrent to this upward 
trend, the complexity and capabilities of weapons being sold internationally are ever 
increasing.178 Defense companies are increasingly interdependent. Increased trade in 
military technology and defense services, result in the diffusion of military technology 
around the world. This trend describes the globalization of the defense industrial complex 
that has led to a surge in the trade of sophisticated weapons systems around of the world. 
Prior to the cold war, the technological complexity and capability of weapons traded 
globally fell far below those being traded on mass today.179 One example of the increased 
technological capabilities being transferred today includes the international transfers of 
ballistic missile defense systems which took place for the first time in the first decades of 
the millennium.180 Another example is the sale of armed unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs). Though unarmed UAVs have been sold internationally since the 1970s, armed 
versions were not transferred until 2007 and recipients have thus far been limited to the 
United Kingdom (UK) and Nigeria.181  The UK and Nigeria are likely to only be the first 
of many international customers for these systems because once a system is transferred 
internationally, it is almost certain to be proliferated further. 
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 Scholars’ predictions of a sharp fall in the arms trade due to the end of the Cold 
War and more recently a predicted fall due to the global financial crisis have both proven 
wrong.182 Arms trade data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) “strongly suggest that overall, global arms expenditure has increased in real 
terms despite declining as a percentage of GDP.”183 In fact, recent data shows that “the 
volume of transfers of major weapons in 2010–14 was 16 percent higher than in 2005–
2009.”184 
 The expansion of the global arms trade has benefited producer states 
economically as well as politically. The U.S. has been one of the top arms exporters in 
the world for the past two decades, accounting for 29% of all arms exports from 2009-
2013.185 The SIPRI Arms Transfer Database lists the U.S. as the top overall arms 
exporter from 1950-2013, however, the Soviet Union and later Russia, did outsell the 
U.S. in a number of individual years including 2013.186 From 2010 to 2013, U.S. exports 
of major conventional weapons systems were valued between about 6.1 and 8.9 billion 
dollars (USD).187 Due in part to the large volume and value of arms exported from the 
U.S., the U.S. has been able to selectively sell its’ arms according to its own foreign 
policy and national security interests without fear of a prohibitive costly economic 
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detriment.188 The U.S. is able to achieve interoperability with its allies by selling systems 
that will work with U.S. military systems in theatre. The U.S. can guard against those 
states who are not as closely aligned by maintaining militarily superior U.S. weapons 
systems. And, the U.S. can use the sale or embargo of its arms to countries as a 
negotiation tool in order to influence other nations.189 However, with power comes 
responsibility. As the top producer and seller of arms in the world, the U.S. must remain 
cognizant of how the arms exported from its shores are effecting the rest of the world.190 
The effects U.S. arms transfers have on the regions importing the weapons, in turn effect 
the U.S. and its’ national security. 
 Due to its regulatory process, the U.S. has the ability to selectively export arms, 
which leads many countries to make assumptions when the U.S. has allowed them to 
purchase major weapon systems. One common assumption is that the U.S. would come to 
the aid of the purchasing country if that country were to need military backing. This may 
not always be a correct assumption and cannot be the case as the U.S. exports to over 94 
countries.191  As an arms supplier, the U.S. must choose whether to resupply or up-arm a 
country once it becomes involved in conflict or whether to halt the sale of any further 
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arms due to the conflict. Exporting arms to unstable regions such as the Middle East has 
and will likely continue to force the U.S. into this uneasy calculous. The U.S. must act 
cautiously to ensure that its arms exports do not act to the detriment of its own national 
security due to the enmeshing multiplex of factors including the growth of the arms trade, 
the increase in the complexity and lethality of weapons being transferred, and the U.S. 
remaining as one of the top producers and exporters of weapons in the world. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  The effect that arms transfers have on various regions is a topic that has been 
examined in academia, but the examinations have tended to focus on how arms transfers 
effect rivalries, the length of war, military disputes, and so forth. Investigation specific to 
how the regional consequences of the importers effect the exporting country has not been 
as thoroughly investigated.  
-Arms transfers’ effect on regional conflicts- 
 The U.S. is typically described as a major power, therefore it is natural to 
reference the scholarly writings on the effects of arms transfers from “major powers,” 
during the course of investigating U.S. arms transfers. However, many scholarly pursuits 
focus on recipient countries that are involved in conflict and how the increase in arms 
effects said conflicts. Volker Krause is one such author. Krause writes about the effect 
arms transfers from major powers have had on militarized disputes within the 1950-1995 
timeframe. Krause found that if these arms transfers are not part of a security alliance, the 
arms aggravate the conflict. Krause goes as far to say that the recipient country is more 
likely to start military action and more likely to be the target of military action when arms 
96 
 
are transferred to it from a major power outside of a formal security pact. However, if the 
recipient country is part of a formal security alignment with the major power, the risk that 
the recipient country will start or be the target of military action is reduced. Krause stops 
short and neglects to investigate how arms transfer may effect regions that are not in 
conflict. Krause also does not go into further analysis to determine how the major power 
is affected.192  
-Arms transfers vs. Alliances- 
 Gerald Sorokin is another scholar whose investigations have contributed to the 
current understanding of the effect of arms on rivalries. Like Krause, Sorokin includes in 
his analysis of arms, the presence or absence of an alliance. According to Sorokin, states 
depend more on their own arms than their allies’ arms if the cost of using their own arms 
is less and the strength of their own arms is greater. States rely on allies’ arms and 
support more when it proves to be less costly and stronger militarily.193 The focus of 
Sorokin’s analysis is on the rationale and actions taken by the states in conflictual 
situations, rather than maintaining focus on the arms trade and the relationship between 
states or how the import of arms effects alliances. Sorokin treats alliances and arms as an 
either/or scenario, where if a country is militarily strong and is able to inexpensively 
maintain its own arms, it does not need to maintain an alliance or import arms. Sorokin 
finds that when states have access to more resources and have increased threats, they 
increase their arms stockpiles, unless it proves to be more cost-effective to strengthen an 
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alliance in lieu of increasing arms. Sorokin argues that states increase their political 
flexibility and autonomy by procuring arms rather than depending on the arms of an 
ally.194 Thus, the implication Sorokin makes in his analysis is that arms exports to 
regional alliances weaken the alliance with the exporter, lessening the dependence of the 
importer, and increasing the ability of the importer to react to external threats 
independently.  
-Arms transfers and Arms races- 
 Beyond the basic question of how arms transfers effect regional conflicts, is the 
question of whether arms transfers spark arms races within the regions the arms are 
exported to. Charles D. Ferguson addresses this query in “Next customer, please: The risk 
in conventional arms sales along with nuclear energy deals.” Ferguson argues that 
conventional weapons transfers lead to nuclear acquisitions, therefore decreasing global 
security. Ferguson argues that this increased proliferation decreases security because as 
weapons are proliferated there are more weapons to keep track of, increasing the risk of 
loss of weapons, conventional or nuclear, to terrorists and the like.  Ferguson takes his 
argument further by stating that beyond his predicted increase in global insecurity, 
alliances will also shift due to these new acquisitions.  Ferguson further states that 
resources that could be utilized for the benefit of civilian populations would be drained in 
arms acquisition efforts.195  
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 Ferguson does not adequately support his argument because he neglects to clearly 
explain how or why this chain reaction occurs and how it alters alliances. Rather 
strikingly, Ferguson mistakenly equates nuclear power and energy cooperation with 
nuclear weapons proliferation. Any counter hypothesis of why or how arms races occur 
are conveniently left unmentioned as well. While Ferguson’s argument lacks supporting 
evidence and confounds peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear cooperation, his argument is 
reminiscent of the security dilemma, a highly investigated and supported theory.  
  The concept of the security dilemma was introduced in 1951 by John Herz in his 
writing Political realism and political idealism, a study in theories and realities. Herz’s 
concept of the security dilemma slightly differs from the argument Ferguson was 
forwarding in his piece on arms transfer and nuclear proliferation. Ferguson argued that 
arms transfers are the primary cause of arms races that in turn lead to nuclear 
proliferation and altering alliances. In contrast Herz argued that although alliances may 
shift due to the security dilemma, it is the unknown nature of each state’s ability to 
defend itself from the increasing arms of others that is the cause of the dilemma in 
security that materializes. The dilemma that ensues is caused by uncertainty and can be 
linked to insecure alliances and the unknown intentions of others, not necessarily a 
buildup of arms.196  
-Arms transfers and U.S. security-  
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 The security dilemma is certainly a dilemma that effects all states in the 
international system. Major Powers like the U.S., are not immune to the problem. 
Andrew Shapiro addresses the need for the U.S. to guard its security in “A New Era for 
U.S. Security Assistance.” Shapiro argues that the U.S. acts to enhance its own national 
security by providing security assistance, including the transfer of weapons. Shapiro 
argues that by enhancing the security of other states, U.S. security is also enhanced 
because of ever increasing global interconnectedness. This interconnectedness, also 
termed globalization, allows for the increased pervasive consequences of conflict to 
extend to other countries around the world, including the U.S. As the effects of conflict 
extend, the value of global partnerships increase. U.S. security assistance allows other 
countries to increase their own security as well as joint and foreign interoperability, 
regional security and global security.197  
 Turning Shapiro’s argument on its head, Toby Craig Jones argues, in “America, 
Oil and War in the Middle East,” that the U.S. arming of the Middle East has cast a 
shadow of war and conflict over the region. Jones argues that the sale of weapons from 
the U.S. to the Middle East has encouraged conflict between states in the region and has 
exacerbated conflict that was previously latent. Furthermore, the U.S. has inextricably 
linked security in the region to oil and has made the availability of affordable oil a 
national security priority. As a result, U.S. national security has become entangled in a 
decade’s long regional conflict that is being exacerbated by sales of U.S. weapons to 
countries within the region. This analysis is not limited to rivalries within the Middle 
                                                          




Eastern region, it also details the transition of prior alignments in the region into rivalries 
and links that transition with increased arms stockpiles. Therefore, Jones implicitly 
forwards the argument that U.S. arms sales not only exacerbate conflict but spark conflict 
between previously aligned states.198  
-The origins of alliances-  
 Stephen Walt, perhaps the pre-eminent scholar on alliances, examines the 
fundamentals of alliances including how and why alliances form in his book, The Origins 
of Alliances. Walt provides the basic theories and analysis that have provided the 
instrumental foundation upon which authors investigating alliances have ground their 
work. Walt’s overarching argument is that the presence of a threat motivates alliance 
formation in order to balance against the threat.199  
 According to Walt, the examination of the effect arms transfers have on regional 
alliances would presuppose the presence of some threat that precipitated the formation of 
the regional alliance. Although this paper seeks to shift focus from the investigation of 
how arms transfers’ effect disputes, pursuant to Walt’s theory on alliances, threats or 
disputes cannot be completely separated from alliances as alliance formation originates in 
a response to threats.  
DEFINITIONS 
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REGIONAL ALLIANCES  
Based on the authority grounded in the work of Stephen Walt, this paper will rely 
on Walt’s definition of alliance. Stephen Walt considers alliances and alignments to be 
one in the same. Walt defines an alliance as “a formal or informal arrangement for 
security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”200 As arms transfers have 
become increasingly global in scale, many arms transfers do not occur between formal 
alliances that have been cemented through ratified treaties. Thus, Walt’s more informal 
definition of alliance is most applicable when analyzing how arms transfers effect 
regional alliances.  
Though many of the alliances between the U.S. and the countries and regions that 
it exports arms to fall into the ‘informal arrangement for security cooperation’ category,  
regional alliances made up of the states that arms are transferred to, more often consist of 
formal arrangements. A region is “a cluster of states that are proximate to each other and 
are interconnected in spatial, cultural and ideational terms in a significant and 
distinguishable manner.”201 This difference between formal and informal alliances, while 
insignificant in terms of Walt’s definition of alliances, is telling as most security threats 
are regional and may therefore prompt formal alliances to counter those threats. The 
threat or threats that regional alliances form to counter-balance, are also likely to exist 
within that same region. The countries within the region likely have similar cultural 
backgrounds and are as exposed to the conflict. Being in the same region, the countries 
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are more likely to better understand the conflict.202 The threats that cause regional 
alliances to form, tend to prompt the formation of formal rather than informal alliances as 
all actors within the alliance are equally threatened due to their proximity. In the case that 
a conflict does erupt into military action, a regional security alliance is able to form a 
quicker response to the threat due to an intimate knowledge of the factors involved and 
the close proximity. The regional alliance is also more likely to act quickly given that the 
countries that are part of the alliance will be effected independent of action since 
proximity necessitates involvement. Conflicts do not recognize geographic boundaries, 
often bleeding over into neighboring territories. Therefore, regional actors are compelled 
to contain and extinguish the conflicts within their region. The member countries “have a 
legitimate vital interest at stake in preserving regional stability.” 203 Despite the will and 
need to act, unfortunately many regional alliances face a lack of capacity.204 This lack of 
capacity is often at least in part due to a lack a funding and functional military capability.  
U.S. ORIGIN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS  
 When states have the requisite funds, the receipt of U.S. origin arms, especially 
sophisticated weapons systems, can help counter regional security partnerships capacity 
issues. These arms can be transferred to regions via Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS), or as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). FMS is the term used by 
the U.S. government for the transfer of arms from the U.S. government directly to a 
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foreign government.205 DCS is U.S. government terminology used for the sale of arms 
from non-governmental private entities to either governmental entities or private entities 
and persons abroad.206 EDA is the U.S. government term for defense equipment that is no 
longer useful to the U.S. military and can be refurbished or defense equipment that the 
U.S. has in excess and can be transferred at a discount or through a grant, for the use of 
foreign governments or militaries.207  
The different modes of arms transfers are not directly addressed in the following 
discussion because it is not relevant how each regional alliance has obtained arms in 
terms of the central question. This paper will focus on how an increase in conventional 
arms effects regional alliances and how that in turn effects U.S. national security. 
Conventional arms transfers refer to “the international transfer (under terms of grant, 
credit, barter or cash) of military equipment, usually referred to as ‘conventional’, 
including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other 
commodities designed for military use.”208 Conventional arms do not include chemical, 
biological or nuclear weapons. The terms weapons and arms will be used 
interchangeably.  
To further specify, major weapons within the conventional weapons definition 
will be those that are referenced in this analysis because the majority of Arms Transfer 
data available is provided by SIPRI’s Arms Transfer Database that tracks the 
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international transfer of major weapons systems. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, 
‘arms’ or ‘weapons’ will describe U.S. origin major conventional weapons systems, to 
include aircraft, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships, engines, artillery, armored vehicles, 
anti-submarine warfare weapons, and air defense systems, transferred internationally via 
grant, credit, barter or cash, and excluding chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and 
small arms, light weapons, man-portable air defense systems, anti-tank missiles, trucks, 
ammunitions, and parts and components.209     
DATA, METHOD AND RESULTS 
THE ARAB LEAGUE 
-Historical Background and Current State of the Middle East- 
Long before President Jimmy Carter announced that “any attempt by an outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the United States of America, and as such an assault will be repelled by any 
means necessary, including military force,” the U.S. had begun to build its strategic 
interest in the Middle East.210 Many argue this strategic interest and causal impact on 
U.S. national security rests on the vast amounts of oil the Middle East produces. 
Regardless of whether or not the only factor tying U.S. interest to the Persian Gulf and 
the larger Middle East is oil, the oil production that occurs in that region does impact 
U.S. economic and therefore U.S. political interests. Though Middle East stability and its 
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ability to produce and sell oil does impact the U.S. and global economies, the region has 
suffered from instability over the past century.  
Not only has interstate conflict, and ethnic and religious conflict plagued the 
Middle East, but in recent years a sharp increase in intrastate instability and non-state 
actors to include terrorist groups have stirred unrest in the region. The Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant or ISIS is one such terrorist group, aside from al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, Boko Haram, and Jabhat-al-Nusra, that is currently carrying out 
violent take-overs of land in Iraq and the surrounding region.211 Interstate conflict has not 
only involved the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and its carry over into other Arab states in 
the region, but inter-Arab conflicts as well. A divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims 
exists in the region. The Sunni states consisting principally of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and 
many of the Gulf States, and the Shia states consisting of principally of Iran and Syria 
make up this divide.212 Instability is also not only a factor between countries, but also 
within each state. This was illustrated in the Arab Spring movement in 2011, which led to 
the challenge of more than one regime in the region. Some of the regimes challenged 
during the Arab Spring include those aligned with U.S. interests, including Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, and Oman.213 These states, especially Saudi Arabia, purchase vast amounts of 
U.S. origin weapons systems.214 
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Whilst all of the conflicts have and continue to play out in the region, whether 
ethnic, religious, territorial, or other, the U.S. has continued to supply arms to Israel and 
many of the Arab led states in the region. Not only have oil rich states in the region been 
able to pay for and amass large amounts of sophisticated weapons, but the U.S. continues 
to maintain a special relationship with Israel through which it ensures Israel’s qualitative 
military edge. That being said, the U.S. ensures that Israel maintains a qualitative military 
edge over its neighbors in the region, while also selling weapons in large quantities to 
other states in the region. Given the seemingly ever-changing dynamics in the region and 
the myriad of conflicts that exist, the U.S. has armed both sides of a conflict at times. Not 
only this, but the U.S. has armed countries that were once seen as important allies in the 
region that over time have become less cooperative.  
Prior to the overthrow of the Shah in the 1979 revolution in Iran, “the United 
States committed to over $22 billion in arms sales” to Iran.215 Prior to this regime change 
Iran was seen as one of the strongest allies of the U.S. in the region. Therefore, the U.S. 
maintained a strong arms trade relationship with Iran until 1979. Iran has been seen as 
and remains a rogue state in the region ever since.216 Iran is not the only state in the 
Middle East which has experienced such an about face in terms of relations with the U.S. 
after having purchased large quantities or arms from the U.S. 
Prior to the U.S. invasion of the country in 2003, when Iraq was still under 
Saddam Hussein’s rule, there was a time when the interest of the U.S. and Iraq did not 
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fully contradict each another.217 After the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, Iran had fallen 
out of alignment with U.S. interests. Iraq and Iran began a protracted eight year battle 
over oil facilities that had been under Iran’s rule. As Iran was no longer a U.S. ally, the 
U.S. was not necessarily opposed to Iraq’s conflict with Iran and, in fact, sold Iraq 
weapons which were used in this conflict. However, once Iraq’s fight with Iran ended, it 
used the same weapons it purchased from the U.S. to invade Kuwait. When the U.S. 
came to the assistance of Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm in 1990, the situation 
evolved so that Iraqi forces used U.S. origin weapons against U.S. forces supporting 
Kuwait. Only after U.S. weapons in Iraq were turned on U.S. forces did the U.S. embargo 
sales of arms to Iraq.218  
Given the recent instability in the Middle East, it is only rational to question the 
sensibility of arming the region with large quantities of often highly sophisticated 
weaponry. The relatively mercurial nature of political relationships has been 
demonstrated more than once by states that purchased large quantities of weapons from 
the U.S. whilst aligned with U.S. interests and precipitously reversed course and became 
roadblocks to U.S. interests. However, when the U.S. does not arm countries that are in 
the market for weapons, those countries do not go without. Russia, formerly the Soviet 
Union, and now China as well, arm those countries that the U.S. does not.219   
-The League- 
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 The Arab League, also called the League of Arab States, established in 1945, 
predates the United Nations.220 Member states of the Arab League include: Algeria, 
Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen.221 The alliance was initially established in “an attempt to 
unite Arab states…, to resist colonial forces…, and to react to the Jewish presence.”222 
Members of the Arab League attempted to further cement their military cooperation in 
1950 with the signing of the “Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Between the States of the Arab League” calling for collective security, military 
cooperation, and joint defense.223 This treaty, however, has been largely un-implemented. 
In fact, it has been argued that rather than truly seeking a united Arab front, authoritarian 
dictators have used the concept of pan-Arabism through the military, as “an instrument of 
control by ethnic minorities.”224 
 Although the Arab League was founded upon the idea of pan-Arabism, the 
League has since shifted its focus as Islamism has seen a resurgence in its place.225 
Regardless, each state has been consumed by its own security concerns and national 
interests, rather than regional security issues. “Between 1945 and 1981, only 6 of the 77 
inter-Arab conflict situations saw a successful intervention by the League.”226 As detailed 
above, the region is riddled with ethnic and inter-state conflicts which have been pointed 
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at in discerning the rationale for why the Arab League, through its long history, has been 
ineffectual in its opposition of Israel and in many other conflicts that have arisen in the 
region. 
 In 2000, there appeared a glimmer of hope for increased effectiveness and 
capability of the Arab League. The establishment of the “League of Arab States 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution between the Arab 
States” opened the door for this hope, giving the League of Arab States the authority to 
intervene in conflicts. Unfortunately, many odds remain against the League: a low 
budget, a history of failed attempts to change, along with the ever present underlying 
turmoil of ethnic, religious, territorial, and non-state actors wreaking havoc.   
-Arms Imports- 
Overall, the Middle East was the second largest recipient region of arms from 2010-
2014, receiving 22 percent of global arms transfers. 227 The increase in imports within the 
Middle East itself from 2005-2009 to 2010-2014 was 25 percent.228 The U.S. was the 
largest arms supplier for the region, accounting for 47 percent of the total arms 
transferred to the region.229 Significantly, this large increase in arms imports occurred in 
the region despite a notable reduction in imports by previously dominant importers due to 
internal conflicts. Two such states with reduced imports who are also members of the 
Arab league include Egypt and Syria. Syria is primarily a customer of Russian arms, 
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however, Egypt had been a large customer for U.S. arms. Instability within the governing 
structure of Egypt prompted by the Arab Spring in 2011, continued with the military 
coup of 2013. As a result U.S. arms exports to Egypt were muted.230  
Despite reduced sales to Egypt, other members of the Arab league made up for those 
reduced transfers. The Arab League is quite sizable, representing 22 members. As a 
result, the analysis of arms imports by its member states will focus on those states who 
were the largest importers from the U.S. or those that imported arms from the U.S. and 
encountered instability issues within the past decade. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Saudi Arabia were 2 of the 5 top arms importers in the world from 2009-2013.231 
Saudi Arabia, alone, quadrupled its arms imports from 2005-2009 to 2010-2014, shifting 
places to the second largest importer of arms in the world for this latter period.232 The 
U.S. was the second largest supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia from 2010-2014, supplying 
35 percent of its arms. This second place is a miniscule difference from the United 
Kingdom, who came in first and supplied Saudi Arabia with 36 percent of its arms during 
the same time period.233 Large orders from this recent time period from the U.S. included 
orders for both combat helicopters and combat aircraft.234 During the same time period, 
the U.S. was by far the largest supplier of arms to the UAE, supplying 58 percent of their 
arms imports.235   
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 Between 2010 and 2014 ballistic missile defense systems were transferred 
internationally for the first time in history. During this time period, all orders for these 
systems were placed with the U.S. “Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) received or ordered Patriot PAC-3 systems from the USA, presumably 
in response to a perceived missile threat from Iran.”236 The transfer of ballistic missile 
defense systems for the first time in the past decade demonstrates the increasing 
sophistication of weapons being transferred abroad. It is interesting that some of the first 
customers for these weapons systems from the U.S. are members of the Arab League due 
to the sophistication of these systems and the instability of the region. While these states 
may very well have more of a need for such a system as they are located in a 
geographically unstable region with known enemy states, these states are not openly 
considered to be amongst the strongest allies of the U.S. Often highly capable weapons 
systems are initially only transffered to countries that are the strongest allies of those 
transfering the weapons. An example of this is the sole known transfer of armed 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the U.S. to the UK which took place within the 
past decade.237 The UK is commonly known as a top ally of the U.S. As such, it makes 
sense that the UK has been the sole recipient of armed UAVs originating in the U.S., to 
date.  
 Thus it appears that the region within which Arab League states are located is so 
strategically important to the U.S., despite the high risk attached to the instability within 
the region and within some of the individual member states, that the U.S. continues to 
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export highly capable weapons systems to them. The U.S. maintains strong alliances with 
the top importers within the Arab League,  including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and 
Qatar. Undeterred by the instability within Egypt, the U.S. has continued its arms transfer 
relationship with this historically strong ally as well.  
 In the face of regional and internal instability, and proven examples of U.S. origin 
arms falling into enemy hands, the U.S. continues to export vast amounts of highly 
sophisticated weapons to the Arab League states. Just within the past decade the U.S. 
transferred tens of thousands of armored vehicles to Iraq amongst other weaponry. 
Despite these transfers, along with those from other states, to Iraqi forces, ISIS forces 
were able to defeat Iraqi forces and pilfer some of those same U.S. origin weapons for 
their own use.238 This is not the first time that arms transferred from the U.S. to Iraq have 
been taken and used against U.S. forces, as occurred during the Gulf War.  
 Given the high level of arms exports to this unstable region where U.S. origin 
arms have even been used against U.S. forces, one might conclude that U.S. arms are sold 
non-discriminantly. In fact, per U.S. regulation, U.S. arms are specifically restricted to 
some countries within the Arab League itself, including Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, 
and Syria.239 Arms exports from the U.S. are restricted to these countries except under 
very specific circumstances, for specific end users, and specific end uses, due to conflicts 
that have occurred and/or are ongoing. Many of these restrictions stem from UN arms 
embargoes of the countries.  
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Despite U.S. arms restrictions to these countries, arms have continued to be 
supplied by other arms exporting states. For example, though deliveries have been 
reduced, Russia has continued to supply Syria with weapons, despite the ongoing armed 
conflict within its borders.240 Even when the U.S. restricts the sale of weapons to a 
specific country, that country can likely obtain arms elsewhere. If a country faces 
restrictions from the U.S., the weapons are likely not as easy to obtain and may not retain 
the same quality and capability of those available from the U.S.  
By selling arms to specific countries, especially in large quantities and those 
which are highly capable, the U.S. enahnces its relations and alliance with the end user 
country. Amongst other recipient states, the U.S. has been able to establish strong 
relationships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. These countries represent some of 
the largest purchasers of weapons from the U.S. in the Arab League. Notwithstanding 
internal instability and multiple changes in leadership, the U.S. and Egypt are working 
towards re-establishing their arms trade and diplomatic relationship. The U.S. continues 
to have overlapping strategic interests with many of the states in the Arab League within 
the Middle Eastern Region. Just recently, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE joined the U.S. led coalition in the 
fight against ISIS in Iraq.241 If the U.S. did not sell weapons to states within the Arab 
League, there would not be as much interoperability for such joint operations. The U.S. 
can use its large weapons sales as a negotiation point in convincing its allies to join with 
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them in the fight against common enemies and in doing so the U.S. simultaneously reaps 
the economic benefit of the sales. 
ASEAN  
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is yet another regional 
organization that is made up of countries with varying ethnic, religious, intra-state 
political differences. In addition to these differences, the states within ASEAN also face 
the growing power of their neighbor, China. Various inter-state conflicts in the early 
1960s including that between the Philippines and Malaysia, Indonesia and Malaysia, and 
Thailand and Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia, as well as civil wars in Vietnam 
and Myanmar in combination with Cold War dynamics led to the creation of ASEAN in 
1967.242  The founding five states of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand pointedly left security matters out of the organizations’ charter.243 However, in 
1976 ASEAN expanded its mandate to include the promotion of regional peace and 
stability and by the 1990s all 10 Southeast Asian states had become members.244 The 
member states of ASEAN now include: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao 
PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.245 
Despite this expansion of the organization’s mandate to address regional peace 
and stability, this aspect of the alliance has never been utilized. In fact, when Malaysia 
and Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore sought to address their territorial disputes, 
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these states relied on the International Court of Justice.246 Member states are reluctant to 
overstep the sovereignty of other states as they aim to preserve their own sovereignty. In 
2009, ASEAN put into motion a plan to strengthen the alliances’ regional peace and 
security mandate through increased regional military cooperation. This strengthening 
however, appears to be prompted more by the regions’ balancing against regional 
hegemons than internal insecurity. “In Southeast Asia most traditional security threats 
have waned and large-scale foreign military interventions are unlikely.”247   
Even when intrastate conflicts have arisen, as did in Cambodia in the 1980s and 
1990s, ASEAN did not use military intervention as a tool, but instead has used the tools 
of diplomacy and humanitarian aid. Though territorial disputes remain an issue in the 
region, recent history has shown those to be less than likely to erupt into military 
conflict.248 The region that ASEAN covers is important to U.S. national security, 
however the region is relatively stable and tends towards peaceful resolution of disputes.  
ASEAN’s mandate emphasizes sovereignty and the peaceful resolution of disputes, thus 
the organization itself does not seek to procure armaments. The countries within ASEAN 
themselves do however maintain military forces necessitating procurement of weapons 
systems from abroad.  
-Arms Imports- 
 Arms imports in the larger region of Asia and Ocean accounted for 48 percent of 
global arms imports in 2010-2014, having increased by 37 percent between the time 
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periods of 2005-2009 and 2010-2014, of which Southeast Asia accounted for 22 
percent.249 Of the ten member states within ASEAN, only Singapore ranks amongst the 
top ten importers of arms in the world, coming in at number ten, with 3 percent of global 
arms imports from 2005-2014.250 The U.S. was by far the top supplier of arms to 
Singapore within that period, supplying 71 percent of its arms imports.251  
 Aside from Singapore, despite not ranking highly amongst the top arms importers 
in the world or even in the larger Asian region in the past decade, countries within South 
East Asia have taken on projects to modernize their fleets. “Singapore received 32 F-15E 
combat air-craft from the United States in 2010–14 … (and Indonesia received) the first 5 
of 24 F-16C aircraft from the USA.”252 However, aside from those exports to Indonesia 
and Singapore, other exporters were the main suppliers for the modernization efforts in 
other ASEAN member states. Russia exported aircraft to Vietnam and Indonesia, South 
Korea exported additional aircraft to Indonesia and the Philippines, Sweden supplied 
Thailand with aircraft, and Spain supplied aircraft to both Malaysia and Singapore.253  
 In fact, just as in the Middle East, the U.S. maintains export restrictions to some 
of the member states of ASEAN despite the greater stability in the region, mainly 
Vietnam.254 Other than explicit restrictions placed on export to Vietnam, other factors 
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that may impact the reduced amount of exports from the U.S. to the region include a 
small amount of funds available for purchases in the region, reduced need for highly 
capable weapons systems due to greater regional stability, and the availability of less 
expensive weapons systems from other suppliers. The region itself presents less 
immediate strategic interest to the U.S. due to the region’s relative stability. This is 
subject to change in the near future given the region’s growing interest in balancing the 
regional hegemon of China. U.S. strategic interest in the region may grow for this reason, 
despite the lack of funding available for armaments as compared to the oil wealth of the 
Arab League states.  
THE AFRICAN UNION 
 The African Union (AU) was proposed in 1999 and became official in 2002. 
Member states of the African Union include: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Republic Arab Saharawi Democratic, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togolese Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.255 The African 
Union’s membership is so expansive that 9 of its member states are also members of the 
Arab League (Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, 
                                                          




and Tunisia). The African Union’s charter was one of the first to explicitly allow for 
intervention. According to its mandate, “the AU allows interventions in grave 
circumstances, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”256 In fact, the 
AU has emphasized security with a strong mandate in its constitution stating one of its 
primary objectives is: “to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.”257 The 
AU established security protocol as a priority from the beginning (in 2002) which 
established a Peace and Security Council to provide guidance and re-emphasized 
collective action through the “Solemn Declaration” in 2004.258 
 The steps and organization that the AU has taken to emphasize security needs is 
impressive and necessary given the membership of many conflict-prone countries. The 
African continent, not unlike the Middle East, faces complex ethnic, religious, 
environmental and non-state security threats and disputes.259 Some of the disputes within 
the Arab League overlap with the AU as their memberships overlap. Already in its’ short 
lifetime since its establishment in 2002, the AU has deployed multiple peacekeeping 
missions, including to Burundi, Darfur in Sudan, Somalia, and the Comoros.260 This vast 
and ethnically diverse continent has made impressive moves to create its own regional 
alliance with a strong emphasis on security, including a mandate for a primarily peace-
keeping centric stand-by force of 8,000 soldiers and 2,000 civilians. 261 However, the AU 
continues to be confronted with resource issues. Unlike other regional alliances, it is not 
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only the regional organization itself that is confronted with a lack of resources, but the 
countries that compose the organization face that the same roadblock on an individual 
level.  
-Arms Imports- 
 Despite the expansive membership of the AU, the strong emphasis on security, 
and a proven record of multiple completed deployments, the lack of resources within the 
alliance and within each member state has reduced the capabilities available. The African 
region received the lowest percentage of arms imports in the world in the period 2010-
2014, receiving only 9 percent of global arms transferred.262 Despite its large 
membership, none of the member states within the AU ranked in the top ten importers of 
arms from 2010-2014. Although its share of world arms transfers remain small in 
comparison to other regions, arms “imports by states in Africa increased by 45 per cent 
between 2005–2009 and 2010–14.”263  
Interestingly, all three of the largest importers in Africa are also members of the 
Arab League (Algeria with 30 percent of regional imports, Morroco with 26 percent, and 
Sudan with 6 percent), two of which are members of the AU (Algeria and Sudan). 
Notably, Algeria, the one country with the largest percentage of arms imports in AU, did 
not receive any of its largest imports of note between 2010 and 2014 from the U.S. 
Algeria received a helicopter from Italy, air defense systems from Russia, self-propelled 
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guns from China, with orders for submarines and combat helicopters from Russia and 
APCs from Germany.264 
Deciphering strategic interest based on U.S. arms exports trends would imply that 
the U.S. has little to no strategic interest in Africa. This conclusion is not valid because it 
is not independent of other contributing factors such as the inability of many African 
states to pay for expensive weapons systems. The U.S. exports some of the most capable 
and consequently the most expensive weapons systems available. It may very well be that 
states in the AU can only afford the less capable systems available which can be 
purchased from other exporting states the likes of China and Russia. The U.S. certainly 
has strategic interests in Africa and should work towards bolstering the capability of the 
AU. The AU has successfully demonstrated its ability to intervene in conflicts on the 
continent. By proving this capability the AU has the ability to take on the burden of 
ensuring regional stability. Regional stability in any region of the globe is in the interest 
and would benefit the U.S. as the most powerful state in the globalized world. 
Demonstrated by the overlapping memberships of the AU and the Arab League, the 
strategic interests of the U.S. in the Arab League states bleeds into the AU’s area of 
operations. No part of the world is disconnected from the rest, and as such, the stability 
and security of all regions is vital to U.S. national security.  
CONCLUSION 
 The recent decade has seen a surge in arms imports within the regions containing 
the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the African Union. 
                                                          
264 Ibid, 4.  
121 
 
The surge has been more evident and dramatic in the Arab League. This is likely due to 
the increased ability of the states within the Arab League to purchase highly complex and 
capable weapons systems due to their expanding coffers filled with profits from oil sales. 
The increase in arms imports in Arab League states is also due to continued instability in 
the region, not only between states, but within states, and increasingly with non-state 
actors. Given the ability of Arab League states to pay the high price tags of American 
made weapons systems, many of the new orders for weapons systems are placed with the 
U.S. The U.S. also has a strategic interest in the region due to its high imports and use of 
oil.  
By maintaining strong arms trade alliances with states in the Arab League, the 
U.S. leaves the door open for enhanced foreign relations with those states. The U.S. is not 
the only arms exporter in the World and if the U.S. will not sell to a state the state can 
easily go to Russia or China for weapons. Syria is  an example of a country that the  U.S. 
resticted sales to and now relies on the alternative source of Russian made weapons. By 
maintaining strong arms sales to the Arab League, U.S. economic security is enhanced 
through contributions to U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
However, the U.S. does not sell weapons to countries based on the fact that if they 
do not, the countries can purchase weapons elsewhere. The sale of weapons, in large 
quantities and of high capability allows the U.S. to strengthen its relations with the 
purchasing states because it demonstrates the trust the U.S. has in the purchasing state 
and the strong alignment between the countries. The ability to halt sales of major weapon 
systems also acts as a barganing tool with which the U.S. can influence its allies to act in 
accordance with the moral imperatives and strategic interests of the U.S. It is in the 
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interest of the U.S. to be the dominant exporter, especially to allied countries situated in 
unstable regions because U.S. regulations are in place to safeguard for regional stability 
and human rights. These exports ultimately boost U.S. foreign relations as well as U.S. 
national security. The regulations in place allow the U.S. to have the ability to halt 
exports in order to prevent arms exports from getting out of control and spiralling into 
arms races. Under U.S. stewardship, weapons sold can be used as a stabilizing deterrent 
in the regions they are exported to, rather than act as an instigator of conflict.  
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The research and data analyzed in this paper regarding U.S. arms export to the 
Arab League, ASEAN, and the African Union provide a solid foundation for future 
research on how arms transfers impact regional alliances and in turn how the originator of 
the arms is impacted. A closer look at individual conflicts and prior arms transfers within 
the regions analyzed, may yield interesting and telling correlations. Additionally the 
analysis of arms exports from competitor producers such as China or Russia could 
provide a useful counterfactual. Would the arms sales of competitor exporting states yield 
differing results within the same regions, or differing resultant impacts on their own 
national security?  It would prove worthwhile to expand the scope of terms in the time 
period studied and expand the regions analyzed in order provide a more comprehensive 
view. In order to provide an in depth analysis on the subject, U.S. arms transfers to the 
Arab League were the focus of this paper. The impact of the arms tranfers on U.S. 
national security yields the most interest to U.S. policy makers and for this reason this 
paper focused on transfers of arms from the U.S. Transfers to the Arab League were the 
focal point because they constitue  a significantly high value for such an unstable region. 
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It was found that overall, U.S. arms transfers to the Arab League enhance U.S. national 
military and economic security. Along with enhancing U.S. relations with recipient 
countries, despite the ongoing instability in the Middle East, it is highly likely that U.S. 





















 The cross-border trade of arms is by no means a new phenomenon, however the 
growth of globalization has expanded and intensified this type of commodity exchange 
(between countries). Defense companies are becoming increasingly transnational with 
global supply and production chains. Highly capable weapon systems are now developed, 
produced, and sold with the involvement of multiple states.  
Increased trade, cooperation, and production of weapons, due to globalization, 
intensified at the end of the Cold War. Shortly thereafter, scholarly investigation of the 
globalization of the defense industrial base followed. Reduced defense spending in the 
U.S., at that time, prompted many companies to merge internationally and increase 
foreign exports of weapons, or face bankruptcy. Scholars were unsure of how this 
increased international activity involving the defense industry would affect global 
security. Now, decades after the end of the Cold War, the long-term effects of this 
globalization can be observed.  
Projected decreases in U.S. defense spending are once again prompting the 
defense industrial base in the U.S. to maintain their profits through sales to foreign 
markets. As a result, U.S. regulators have been easing restrictions on the export of 
weapons. Due to the prospect of further increases in foreign weapons sales, in 
combination with eased U.S. export restrictions, now is an ideal time to explore the 
effects of the globalization of defense production and distribution.  
125 
 
 This paper analyzed the effects of international arms production and U.S. arms 
exports on U.S. national security. Through the analysis of the post-Cold War 
globalization of the defense industrial base, joint international design and production 
programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter, and the rise of foreign competitor 
manufacturing hubs like China, the globalization of defense production was found to 
have a net positive impact on U.S. national security. Though the U.S. must guard against 
weapons proliferation, loss of government oversight, increased dependence on foreign 
suppliers for parts, loss of U.S. military technological superiority, and the rise of 
competitor manufacturing hubs, the positive effects outweigh these negatives. The 
globalization of the defense industrial complex has allowed for the maintenance of the 
strength of the U.S. defense industrial base, which continues to provide the U.S. military 
with technologically superior weaponry and contribute to U.S. GDP. Globalization of 
production and increased exports have opened up new markets for the defense industrial 
base to exploit in a period of declining revenues from traditional sources, in this case the 
U.S. As a result, interoperability with allies has strengthened and U.S. government 
procurement costs have been reduced.  
 The study of U.S. arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and Egypt also revealed a 
positive net impact. These case studies demonstrate that U.S. arms transfers to allies 
further strengthen U.S. national military and economic security. This positive impact 
extends beyond the U.S., strengthening U.S. alliances and U.S. interests abroad. At the 
same time, several of the aforementioned potential negative impacts arise, including 
weapons proliferation and loss of U.S. military superiority. Regional stability, regime 
stability, and security interests also factor into the impacts of these arms transfers. 
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Overall, U.S. arms transfers to allies demonstrate trust, act to strengthen mutual security 
interests, increase interoperability, and increase the ability of the importer to defend 
itself. The net effect is a bolstering of the alliance and increase in the economic and 
military security of the states involved.  
 To further explore the impacts of U.S. arms transfers, the effects of U.S. arms 
transfers to the regional alliances of the Arab League, ASEAN, and the African Union 
were deconstructed and analyzed. This analysis revealed that once again a net positive 
impact was overwhelmingly apparent despite the existence of potential negative 
outcomes. Arms transfers continued to show a relationship that acted to enhance U.S. 
relations with the regional alliances, further U.S. interests in the regions, enhance 
regional stability and security, increase regional ability to address security issues without 
U.S. intervention, advance U.S. moral imperatives and enhance U.S. military and 
economic security. Despite the abundant promise foreseen in maintaining these 
relationships, cautionary practices must be maintained. The U.S. must not ignore the 
potential for unwanted proliferation, the improper end use of U.S.-origin weapons, or 
regional and regime stability concerns. 
 As long as the negative effects of U.S. arms exports and the further globalization 
of the defense industrial complex are guarded against, the positive effects greatly 
outweigh any potential deterrent factors. The continued globalization of defense 
production and increases in U.S. arms exports represent an upward trend highly 
indicative of an exponentially booming defense industrial complex. With a strong 
regulatory regime in place, the U.S., as the top arms producer and exporter in the world, 
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will continue to benefit economically, militarily, and diplomatically from its robust 
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